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Washington and Riyadh are worried that the third party to the normalization agreement will endanger their security interests in the name of political interests – so they're preparing a contingency plan, whereby bilateral cooperation is not dependent on Israeli-Saudi normalization
A normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia is presented as if it were a reward offered to a recalcitrant child in exchange for agreeing to take a bitter medicine. If signed, such an agreement would be a groundbreaking move that – according to optimistic supporters – wouldn't only serve Israel's strategic interest by completing the Arab world's recognition of its existence and security needs, but also bring about unprecedented economic opportunities.
Such an agreement may also influence other Muslim countries such as Indonesia, which already announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, mainly due to its hopes of fulfilling all conditions for its possible joining the OECD. Malaysia and Pakistan may also be lured in by such a deal and establish with Israel a so-called protective wall against Iran.
However, the United States and Saudi Arabia have a strong bilateral interest in signing a defense pact between them, including a deal that would allow the Saudis to develop an independent nuclear program even without a normalization with Israel.
The current situation is that the conditioning of a Saudi-American defense agreement and the approval of nuclear cooperation between them as part of a normalization deal with Israel makes the interests of both countries a hostage of the Israeli government.
This is because, according to the current framework, without a normalization deal between Israel and the Saudis, a defense agreement will not be signed between the Saudis and the United States – a fact that jeopardizes the Saudi nuclear plan.
The Guardian reported on Wednesday that Saudi Arabia is pushing for a plan B, according to which the two countries drafted a set of agreements on security and technology-sharing as part of a broader agreement involving Israel.
According to the Guardian, in the absence of a cease-fire in Gaza and as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to resist the establishment of a Palestinian state – and is pushing for a military invasion of the southern Gaza city of Rafah – the Saudis are aiming for a more modest plan which excludes Israel.
According to this alternative plan, the Guardian reports, the United States and Saudi Arabia would sign a bilateral defense deal that would entail U.S. assistance in the building of a Saudi civil nuclear energy program and a sharing in the field of artificial intelligence. Israel will then be offered a normalization deal with the Saudis in exchange for Israeli approval of the two-state solution. This plan B, however, says that the completion of the U.S.-Saudi deals wouldn't require Netanyahu's approval.
A clear hint of the possibility of a split between these two channels was revealed in U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's statement during a World Economic Forum meeting in Riyadh on Monday.
"When it comes to normalization, I'm not going to speak for our hosts here, except to say that we have done intense work together over the last months," Blinken said during a conversation with World Economic Forum President Borge Brende.
"To move forward with normalization, two things will be required: calm in Gaza and a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. So to the extent we finish our work between us, then I think what's been a hypothetical or a theoretical question suddenly becomes real," he added.
A defense pact with the United States is a fundamental change for the Saudis who, for decades, chose to conduct their military cooperation with the Americans in secrecy. After the Second Gulf War, Saudi Arabia expelled all American forces from its territory including the demand that the large American base in Al-Kharj will also be removed. The outcome made Qatar the host of the largest American base in Al-Odeid and rose it to the status of a senior non-NATO U.S. ally about two years ago.
About a decade and a half later, relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia deteriorated and reached an unprecedented low. The change for the worse was even more drastic than it was after the September 11 attacks in which at least 19 Saudis were involved or after the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018.
A year later, Saudi Arabia was slapped in the face by then-President Donald Trump. The Saudis expected an American military response against Iran who attacked the large oil facilities of the state-owned Saudi Aramco. But Trump clarified that he didn't intend to retaliate since the attack didn't target U.S. assets. He later clarified that he was willing to assist in the defense of the kingdom but only for a fee.
Biden started his term full of rage and disgust toward Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his kingdom, which he promised to treat as a state that his administration has nothing to do with. About 18 months in office – during which the war in Ukraine erupted, the global energy crisis deepened and the halt in negotiations for a new nuclear deal with Iran – and Biden was forced to shake Bin Salman's hand.
Even after Biden's visit, however, Saudi Arabia didn't rush to adopt the idea of forming a "NATO of the Middle East" that was suggested during former President Trump's term. In the meanwhile, the Saudis continued to promote their commercial and military relations with China and Russia, remained neutral toward the sanctions imposed on Russia, and – about a year ago – granted China an important political gain in the fact that the Chinese mediated between Iran and the Saudis in reestablishing their relations.
The Saudi sway between the United States – their historical ally – China and Russia, clarified that in the global strategic campaign that the Americans are waging against their two rivals, they cannot neglect the Middle East and especially not the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia.
A defense pact with Saudi Arabia, regardless of its relations with Israel, has become a fundamental cornerstone of the "American wall" that attempts to block Russia and China's aspirations toward the West.
Such a defense pact may not severe the commercial ties between the Saudis, China and Russia – nor will it lead to a new disconnect between them and Iran – but, at least potentially, it may deny China from remaining a central player in the strategic equation in which the Saudis are key members.
Such a pact would oblige Saudi Arabia to give up its political maneuvering room, but it seems that this is a price that the Saudis are willing to pay in exchange for an American commitment to defend them if attacked.
The scope of the American commitment to the Saudis, however, still requires further detail and it will also have to be approved by the American Congress. For example, it isn't clear who will define what constitutes an attack on Saudi Arabia that would require American mobilization. Will an attack on Saudi ships in the Persian Gulf or the firing of missiles by the Houthi rebels from Yemen into Saudi territory automatically result in an American Air Force retaliation? Will the Saudis approve of a massive American military presence in their territory? How will it be guaranteed that American technology will indeed be transferred to Saudi Arabia?
These are several examples of some difficult questions, which may have already been resolved in the discussions Blinken mentioned earlier this week. He still, however, must convince Congress to support the decision.
The question of a normalization deal between Israel and the Saudis seemed not to be an obstacle to the potential defense pact between the kingdom and the United States, but this changed after October 7.
Saudi Arabia originally demanded that in exchange for a normalization deal with Israel, certain measures would be implemented to "improve the living conditions of the Palestinians." But since then, they conditioned the potential deal with taking irreversible steps toward the establishment of a Palestinian state – a demand that the Israeli government refuses to accept.
At least publicly, Saudi Arabia doesn't specify what those steps are. It seems, however, that they include a recognition of the UN Security Council in a Palestinian State. The United States opposed such a demand and vetoed a similar resolution proposal that was presented to the Security Council on April 18.
The Americans will ultimately have to decide where their vital strategic interest lies. This is especially true when Israel treats a normalization deal with the Saudis as a minefield that cannot be crossed due to the political cost involved, even though its security significance is clear.
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