https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2018.1532633
~~ recommended by emil karpo ~~
1. Introduction
Like air, nationalism is both ubiquitous and elusive. It permeates the global system, states, peoples’ behavior and can be seen as both conservative and as a revolutionary force, threating the status quo. The end of nationalism has been predicted multiple times. When Eric Hobsbawm wrote his seminal study on nationalism in the 1980s, he saw his subject as a dying breed (Hobsbawm,
1990). Yet, the end of the cold war ushered in a period nationalism, reflected in civil wars and genocide from Yugoslavia to Rwanda. Until recently, that period of nationalist resurgence appeared behind us.
Over the past years, rising nationalism is seen everywhere and in everything. From the election of Donald Trump to Brexit, the nationalist policies of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi and the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the success of far-right parties in Italian, German and Austrian elections in 2017 and 2018, nationalism appears to be on rise globally (Bremmer,
2017b). News coverage of nationalism has been global, focusing on US elections, and British referendum, but also government policies in Philippines, China and India, as well as in South Africa (Google Trends).
After the defeat of Marine Le Pen in French presidential elections in May 2017, the moderate success of far-right candidates Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Norbert Hofer in Austria, some media have speculated that the nationalist and populist wave might be abating (Baker,
2017). Of course, both perspectives are misleading. Neither is there an inevitable tide of nationalism that is engulfing the world, nor is nationalism universally in decline. Despite shared dynamics and integration, the world remains too diverse to be caught up in a single torrent of nationalism, not to mention that even if this were to be the case, the expressions would be too diverse to form a coherent movement. With their eyes on elections, media easily ignore the structural underpinnings and global dynamics. Citizens of Austria do not turn nationalist because their counterparts in the United States do, nor are the structural similarities so great that there is a universally fertile ground for nationalist movements from India to Kentucky. Nationalism, authoritarianism and populism are also easily conflated, while they can be mutually reinforcing they are distinct and can occur independently. When media talk about nationalism today, they mean a nationalism that includes protectionism, isolationism, xenophobia and anti-elite discourse.
This essay aims to explore the claim that there is a global rise of nationalism. First, it defines nationalism today, conceptualizes different forms of nationalism and their associated risks and then explores the relationship with related concepts, such as populism and authoritarianism. Second, the article explores nationalism to determine which trends, if any, can be noted globally. This section considers global attitudes that can serve to understand nationalism, the rise of nationalist parties, the impact and dynamic nationalist policies and finally the trends in ethnically motivated violence. The final section summarizes the evidence and outlines possible consequences for policy-making. Overall, I argue that while there is no universal trend towards nationalism, it has become more prevalent in global politics in recent years. This increased visibility is less attributable to a shift of global attitudes, but rather of the political and social articulation of these attitudes. Determining the causes for this shift are country-specific, but are overall grounded in the resonance of anti-elite discourse and a crisis of liberal democracy. No article can provide an exhaustive global perspective, neither does this try to do. Instead, it seeks to reflect on trends in countries around the world and try to offer an understanding of this global phenomenon that is neither alarmist, nor ignores patterns that transcend one country, region or continent.
2. Conceptualizing Nationalism
Nationalism is best understood as a malleable and narrow ideology, which values membership in a nation greater than other groups (i.e. based on gender, parties, or socio-economic group), seeks distinction from other nations, and strives to preserve the nation and give preference to political representation by the nation for the nation. I distinguish between latent nationalism that is ubiquitous and can serve to include migrants or exclude minorities, but is constant and steady, described by Michael Billig as ‘banal nationalism’, an endemic condition that shapes society (
1995). From the flags flown, the stamps and advertisement, the world around most citizens normalizes the nation. These markers remind us that it is better to buy French, American, German than from other nations, that the weather is constrained to the national maps of weather forecasts, that the heroes we commemorate are national and that we pledge allegiance, stand or fly a flag. The organization of the world into states that are called nations, hence ‘United Nations’ rather than the more appropriate ‘United States’, has created the endemic sense that the world should and is first and foremost divided into nations that also happen to be states—both are largely fictions.
In contrast, the worry of nationalism as a ‘wave’ alludes to its revolutionary side. The virulent nationalism that rejects the status quo and seeks to reassert the will of an imagined community over a political or cultural space is different from, but draws on, endemic nationalism.
Nationalism is, of course, not a force of its own, it is man-made. While the scholars up to the 1990s have focused on the larger processes that shaped nationalism, literacy, communication, the emergence of the modern state and standardized languages, research in recent decades has shifted our attention to the actors, the ‘ethnic entrepreneurs.’ Nationalism does not exist by itself, but has to be promoted and its members have to be convinced to belong to this group (Brubaker,
2004). This requires media, political, social and cultural elites.
Conventionally, nationalism has been distinguished between an ethnic and a civic variant. Civic nationalism is based on citizenship and the ability of individuals to join the nation, whereas ethnic nationalism is based on the myth of common descent and is thus less inclusive (Kohn,
We can thus categorize nationalism along two axes (), the level of inclusion and exclusion, as well as whether nationalism is endemic or virulent. This allows us for a more precise identification of nationalism as a force that threatens the status quo versus a more established nationalism that might display exclusionary features, but lacks the virulent and potentially violent dimension.
Figure 1. Conceptualizing nationalism
The intensity of nationalism in a given society can thus be measured through a number of indicators, such as latent or structural factors, exclusionary citizenship, socio-economic marginalization, and more virulent and immediate factors including media discourses, support for nationalist parties and violence against particular groups ().
Figure 2. Dynamics of nationalism
Virulent exclusionary nationalism does not emerge out of the blue, but rather it requires a series of factors to align. First, while nationalism might be a latent feature of a given society and the level of exclusion might very, this in itself does not trigger virulent exclusionary nationalism that dominates political discourse, elections and policy. For nationalism to become virulent, a critical juncture is required, a particular moment of crisis. Thus, virulent nationalism can be best understood as a response to indigenous or exogenous shocks to an existing system. These shocks might be ideological, economic, institutional or social.
For such a critical juncture to occur at the global level, a global crisis is required, such as the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War. It is thus during this global critical juncture that we witnessed the peak of ethnic conflict since the end of World War Two, as both ideological conflicts became infused with ethnic contestation and new conflicts emerged. The global economic crisis in 2008 and the following year might constitute a similar critical juncture and has been linked to such disparate phenomena as the rise of Donald Trump, the collapse of autocracies in the Arab world in 2011 and the crisis of the EU.
The escalation from virulent to violent nationalism is best understood through the concept of frames. These cognitive frames through which individuals interpret the social world around them help them structure their behavior. When the ‘normal’ frame predominates, it prevents people from using violence against others. Once the ‘crisis’ frame is brought about, the normal context is replaced by a crisis that can facilitate the use of force (Oberschall,
2017) have been key themes in global reporting. Authoritarianism, populism and nationalism are interlinked, yet distinct phenomena.
Authoritarianism is a form of government that can draw on the other two, but also exists separately. There are other forms of legitimacy that autocrats can draw on (output legitimacy, such as economic growth, or input legitimacy, such as theocracy, communism). Nationalism provides, however, an important source of legitimacy, either as building legitimacy against external actors or against domestic others (minorities and opposition). However, it is often unconsolidated democracies that are the most susceptible to virulent nationalism. This is for two distinct reasons: (1) During periods of democratization, new institutions and rules have to be set that define the political community, consider the constitution, citizenship or electoral laws: is the state a nation-state, does a core nation have privileged access to citizenship, are ethnic kin allowed to vote or some groups excluded? (2) Political competition is imperfect and nationalism provides for an easy and ready-made ideology that can compete on the ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Helbing,
The other concept that is often mentioned interchangeably with nationalism is populism. Similar to nationalism, populism is a versatile ideology. It seeks to represent ‘the people’ against an elite, however defined. It thus promotes majoritarianism and rejects institutions that restrain the supposed will of the majority (Mudde & Kaltwasser,
2017, 6). If populists define the people in national terms, a tempting strategy in both nation-states and in multinational states, populism and nationalism merge, whereby the ‘corrupt elite’ can be either a minority, which is accused of holding political or economic power (as is often the case in anti-Semitic or anti-Chinese strategies) or the elite is accused of being beholden to foreign interests. Populists need not be autocrats, but the implicit erosion of checks and balances and the Manichean worldview of populism does lend itself as both a legitimizing strategy for autocrats, or more importantly, populists drift towards authoritarianism in power.
Thus, populism, authoritarianism and nationalism can occur separately, they are interlinked and can be mutually reinforcing. Few nationalist movements do not resort to populist strategies and do not appeal to authoritarian personalities.
3. Assessing the Rise of Nationalism
Nationalism appears to be on the rise globally, but here we have to examine whether we are genuinely witnessing a widespread rise of nationalism, and if this rise is indeed global and what explains this transnational and trans-continental dynamics.
So what do we mean when we talk about the spread or rise of nationalism? First, there are attitudes: Do citizens around the world give priority to the nation, value it over identities and give it greater weight. Thus, is there a visible shift from endemic to more virulent nationalism in terms of attitudes? Second, how are attitudes reflected in terms of political choices? Do citizens around the world vote for nationalists? Finally, does this support lead to either policies or violent nationalism, in the form of ethnic violence, such as hate crimes or civil war? Finally, how does nationalism spread and is the current visible expression of nationalism temporary, or more structural and permanent?
Nationalism is notoriously difficult to measure. First, attitudes and their social and political manifestations can differ. Second, in most countries, nationalism has a negative association, thus measuring nationalism requires proxies. These will differ around the world. The fear of immigrants is more salient in post-industrial societies, but less in others. The desire for homogeneity is an important dimension of nationalism in countries that have a dominant core nation, but not necessarily in very diverse societies. When we are considering the recent rise of nationalism, in its various forms we can therefore only indicate trends and patterns, not give a definitive narrative.
In taking a global perspective, we are not interested in whether there is endemic nationalism. We assume there is in many countries around the world. We are seeking to ascertain whether, or not, there has been a notable shift over the past decade, indicating a rise of more virulent nationalism.
To measure this shift, this study examines available evidence concerning:
Attitudes
The rise of nationalist parties
Nationalist policies
Nationalist violence and Hate crimes
3.1. Global Shifts in Attitudes
Nationalism is multi-dimensional, as it based on the distinction from others, the border making, the identification with other members of the group and the ideas associated with it and relative importance given to it over other forms of identity. We seek to capture the global trends, also based on available data from surveys that offer a global or sometimes at least a continental reach. Thus, this section examines attitude shifts in the following areas (1) trust in other nationalities (perceived out-groups); (2) pride in the Nation; (3) isolationism; (4) rank of national identity over other identities; and (5) State vs. ethnic identity ().
Figure 3. Low levels of trust of people of another nationality (World Values Survey)4
Nationalism is based on distinguishing between members of the own nation, the in-group, and others, the out-group. One way to measure the strength of this distinction is trust and whether members of one nation trust members of nations. Data drawn from the World Value Survey between 2004 and 2014 suggest that the levels of citizens who do not (very much or at all) trust people from other nationalities vary greatly, from relatively low levels of distrust in multinational immigrant societies as the United States, Australia and Argentina to high levels in Thailand or Morocco. While cross-country comparisons are difficult, also based on different levels of experience with nationals from other countries, the average is indicative as it has not changed significantly during the two surveying cycles, suggesting an overall stable level.
Pride in the own nation also offers insight in nationalism. While often described as ‘patriotism’, pride indicates individual identification with a collectivity. The World Value Survey asked citizens to indicate the level of pride that they take in their nation. Again, the degree to which citizens are very proud around the world would require a multi-causal approach, with citizens in developing countries (Ghana, Columbia, Thailand) taking greater pride and at the other end of the spectrum states that do not match up to the nation (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea). Yet, the shifts have been limited and the unweighted average of 25 countries around the world indicates a minimal change. Thus, as the previous measure of trust, pride is not undergoing a global shift in the past decades ().
Figure 4. Citizens who are very proud of nationality (World Value Survey)
Isolationism is another important dimension of nationalist attitudes. Isolationism or autonomy rejects a transnational approach to resolving challenges and rejects both intervention and cooperation among states. Isolationism, of course, has very diverse causes and it would be simplistic to believe that it has similar causes in large global powers, such as the United States and in countries that have experienced colonial rule and where many citizens might associate external intervention with colonialism.
Based on Pew Global data, support for the assessment that countries should deal with their own problems can be taken as a proxy for isolationism (see ). The results need to be understood in their particular context, as Hungary and Greece have the highest level of isolationism in 2016. In both cases the immediate, external, EU (or Eurogroup) scrutiny is crucial in understanding attitudes, suggesting that these attitudes are a function of very specific circumstances. Considering the overall data, where available, between 2010 and 2016, there has been no clear trend towards more isolationism.
Figure 5. Support for countries dealing with their own problems (Pew Global)5
One measure of nationalism is the weight and exclusivity given to national identity over other ‘levels of identity’. These may be local or regional, or they might focus on other collectivities, such as religion or tribe, finally, they might scale upwards to a supranational identity, such as a continent, a supranational political project (e.g. as the AU, EU) or global identity.
An examination of global trends in this measure does not suggest a rise of national, exclusionary identities. Among citizens around the world surveyed between 2009 and 2014 in two waves of surveys, the level of those who don’t see themselves as citizens of the world has not shifted significantly. While some countries (Morocco, Germany, Romania) witnessed a decline of those not identifying as ‘citizen of the world’, others (China, Jordan) saw an increase. The trend across all continents suggests that there is no clear pattern, nor that there is a negative trend ().
Figure 6. I see myself as a citizen of the world: Disagree or strongly disagree (World Value Survey)
In Europe, there has also been no negative trend in identifying with the Europe. In the Spring 2018 Eurobarometer, 70% of Europeans identified to some extent as EU citizens. This result is the highest since first asked in 2010. A majority of Europeans also see themselves also as having a dual European and national identity, 61% in Spring 2018, with younger people expressing a stronger attachment to the EU (Eurobarometer, 2018; Stone, 2017). Thus, there is no trend suggesting a decline in supranational identities, be they global or European.
In multiethnic and multinational states in Africa, the identification with the sub-state ethnic group is a key measure of nationalism. Identification with the state can be considered also as nationalism, but the more virulent and conflict-prone identifier is the ethnic group. Thus, strong identification with the state or strong multiple identities, such as with the state and the respective ethnic group can be considered as weakening nationalism. Multiple surveys part of the Afrobarometer suggests that in 20 countries the overall ratio of those who identify exclusively or predominantly with their ethnic group has not changed significantly between 2008 and 2015.
Overall, Zambia, Uganda and Kenya can be considered the most ethnically fragmented African states, whereas the level of politicization is greatest also includes South Africa (Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015). Among the most ethnically fragmented and politicized societies, we can note a marked increase in ethnic identification in Zambia and South Africa. This is closely associated with the use of ethnic identity by former presidents Jacob Zuma in South Africa (Johnson, 2010) and Michael Sata in Zambia (Geloo, 2012) ().
Figure 7. Primary identification with ethnic group in sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer)6
Before we turn from attitude to action, either in terms of support for nationalist parties or violence, we are going to briefly explore links between nationalism and other factors that can help explain where and when it occurs.
First, a recent Pew survey of post-Communist Europe indicates that there is a clear correlation between perceived cultural superiority, which can be understood as a measure of nationalism, and conflictual relationship with Western values (). This suggests that in this region, nationalism is in part understood as anti-Western. More broadly, nationalism requires an ‘other’ to define itself against, which might be either minorities within, neighboring nations or states, or global enemies, be they states (often great powers) or transnational groups or individuals, such as George Soros serving as the other in Hungary and a number of other Central and East European countries.
One key question to account for nationalism is the role of exposure to diversity. Does diversity breed tensions, epitomized in the saying that ‘good fences make good neighbors’ or do high fences make actually bad neighbors? While it is impossible to give a clear and definite answer, there are strong indications that the contact hypothesis first formulated by Yehuda Amir in 1969 (Amir, 1994), holds. When correlating the size of the largest ethnonational group and support for homogeneity, we find a clear correlation (see ). Of course, such large-scale correlations cannot show individual experiences with diversity. However, studies within countries paint a similar picture. Incidents of anti-refugee violence and protest in Germany have occurred in areas with a disproportionally small number of refugees and population of foreign origin (Benček & Strasheim, 2016). This observation does not hold universally as there also examples where regions, which are economically deprived and have higher than average numbers of foreigners experience above average anti-foreigner sentiment. However, multiple studies show that personal experience and contact with foreigners reduces anti-foreigner sentiment (Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, & Causey, 2013).
Figure 9. Support for homogeneity and size of the largest nation in Central and Eastern Europe8 (Pew, 2017)
This, as Amir points out, does not mean that any contact between members of different groups improves interethnic relations (1994). A recent analysis in the Economist suggests that support for Brexit was higher in smaller communities, which experienced a large increase of migration in recent decades. Thus, inhabitants in larger urban centers, like London have been more used to exposure to migrants, while those in smaller towns have viewed migration as a greater threat (Economist, 2017a).
Altogether, the different surveys suggest that there has been no significant global shift towards exclusionary virulent nationalist attitudes. There has been country-based variations, none of which dramatic, none of it particularly striking. Thus, the manifestations of nationalism around the world are not the result of changing global attitudes, but rather the result of more virulent expressions of nationalism or country- or region-specific.
Nationalism is based on distinguishing between members of the own nation, the in-group, and others, the out-group. One way to measure the strength of this distinction is trust and whether members of one nation trust members of nations. Data drawn from the World Value Survey between 2004 and 2014 suggest that the levels of citizens who do not (very much or at all) trust people from other nationalities vary greatly, from relatively low levels of distrust in multinational immigrant societies as the United States, Australia and Argentina to high levels in Thailand or Morocco. While cross-country comparisons are difficult, also based on different levels of experience with nationals from other countries, the average is indicative as it has not changed significantly during the two surveying cycles, suggesting an overall stable level.
Pride in the own nation also offers insight in nationalism. While often described as ‘patriotism’, pride indicates individual identification with a collectivity. The World Value Survey asked citizens to indicate the level of pride that they take in their nation. Again, the degree to which citizens are very proud around the world would require a multi-causal approach, with citizens in developing countries (Ghana, Columbia, Thailand) taking greater pride and at the other end of the spectrum states that do not match up to the nation (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea). Yet, the shifts have been limited and the unweighted average of 25 countries around the world indicates a minimal change. Thus, as the previous measure of trust, pride is not undergoing a global shift in the past decades ().
Figure 4. Citizens who are very proud of nationality (World Value Survey)
Isolationism is another important dimension of nationalist attitudes. Isolationism or autonomy rejects a transnational approach to resolving challenges and rejects both intervention and cooperation among states. Isolationism, of course, has very diverse causes and it would be simplistic to believe that it has similar causes in large global powers, such as the United States and in countries that have experienced colonial rule and where many citizens might associate external intervention with colonialism.
Based on Pew Global data, support for the assessment that countries should deal with their own problems can be taken as a proxy for isolationism (see ). The results need to be understood in their particular context, as Hungary and Greece have the highest level of isolationism in 2016. In both cases the immediate, external, EU (or Eurogroup) scrutiny is crucial in understanding attitudes, suggesting that these attitudes are a function of very specific circumstances. Considering the overall data, where available, between 2010 and 2016, there has been no clear trend towards more isolationism.
Figure 5. Support for countries dealing with their own problems (Pew Global)5
One measure of nationalism is the weight and exclusivity given to national identity over other ‘levels of identity’. These may be local or regional, or they might focus on other collectivities, such as religion or tribe, finally, they might scale upwards to a supranational identity, such as a continent, a supranational political project (e.g. as the AU, EU) or global identity.
An examination of global trends in this measure does not suggest a rise of national, exclusionary identities. Among citizens around the world surveyed between 2009 and 2014 in two waves of surveys, the level of those who don’t see themselves as citizens of the world has not shifted significantly. While some countries (Morocco, Germany, Romania) witnessed a decline of those not identifying as ‘citizen of the world’, others (China, Jordan) saw an increase. The trend across all continents suggests that there is no clear pattern, nor that there is a negative trend ().
Figure 6. I see myself as a citizen of the world: Disagree or strongly disagree (World Value Survey)
In Europe, there has also been no negative trend in identifying with the Europe. In the Spring 2018 Eurobarometer, 70% of Europeans identified to some extent as EU citizens. This result is the highest since first asked in 2010. A majority of Europeans also see themselves also as having a dual European and national identity, 61% in Spring 2018, with younger people expressing a stronger attachment to the EU (Eurobarometer, 2018; Stone, 2017). Thus, there is no trend suggesting a decline in supranational identities, be they global or European.
In multiethnic and multinational states in Africa, the identification with the sub-state ethnic group is a key measure of nationalism. Identification with the state can be considered also as nationalism, but the more virulent and conflict-prone identifier is the ethnic group. Thus, strong identification with the state or strong multiple identities, such as with the state and the respective ethnic group can be considered as weakening nationalism. Multiple surveys part of the Afrobarometer suggests that in 20 countries the overall ratio of those who identify exclusively or predominantly with their ethnic group has not changed significantly between 2008 and 2015.
Overall, Zambia, Uganda and Kenya can be considered the most ethnically fragmented African states, whereas the level of politicization is greatest also includes South Africa (Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015). Among the most ethnically fragmented and politicized societies, we can note a marked increase in ethnic identification in Zambia and South Africa. This is closely associated with the use of ethnic identity by former presidents Jacob Zuma in South Africa (Johnson, 2010) and Michael Sata in Zambia (Geloo, 2012) ().
Figure 7. Primary identification with ethnic group in sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer)6
Before we turn from attitude to action, either in terms of support for nationalist parties or violence, we are going to briefly explore links between nationalism and other factors that can help explain where and when it occurs.
First, a recent Pew survey of post-Communist Europe indicates that there is a clear correlation between perceived cultural superiority, which can be understood as a measure of nationalism, and conflictual relationship with Western values (). This suggests that in this region, nationalism is in part understood as anti-Western. More broadly, nationalism requires an ‘other’ to define itself against, which might be either minorities within, neighboring nations or states, or global enemies, be they states (often great powers) or transnational groups or individuals, such as George Soros serving as the other in Hungary and a number of other Central and East European countries.
One key question to account for nationalism is the role of exposure to diversity. Does diversity breed tensions, epitomized in the saying that ‘good fences make good neighbors’ or do high fences make actually bad neighbors? While it is impossible to give a clear and definite answer, there are strong indications that the contact hypothesis first formulated by Yehuda Amir in 1969 (Amir, 1994), holds. When correlating the size of the largest ethnonational group and support for homogeneity, we find a clear correlation (see ). Of course, such large-scale correlations cannot show individual experiences with diversity. However, studies within countries paint a similar picture. Incidents of anti-refugee violence and protest in Germany have occurred in areas with a disproportionally small number of refugees and population of foreign origin (Benček & Strasheim, 2016). This observation does not hold universally as there also examples where regions, which are economically deprived and have higher than average numbers of foreigners experience above average anti-foreigner sentiment. However, multiple studies show that personal experience and contact with foreigners reduces anti-foreigner sentiment (Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, & Causey, 2013).
Figure 9. Support for homogeneity and size of the largest nation in Central and Eastern Europe8 (Pew, 2017)
This, as Amir points out, does not mean that any contact between members of different groups improves interethnic relations (1994). A recent analysis in the Economist suggests that support for Brexit was higher in smaller communities, which experienced a large increase of migration in recent decades. Thus, inhabitants in larger urban centers, like London have been more used to exposure to migrants, while those in smaller towns have viewed migration as a greater threat (Economist, 2017a).
Altogether, the different surveys suggest that there has been no significant global shift towards exclusionary virulent nationalist attitudes. There has been country-based variations, none of which dramatic, none of it particularly striking. Thus, the manifestations of nationalism around the world are not the result of changing global attitudes, but rather the result of more virulent expressions of nationalism or country- or region-specific.
3.2. The Rise of Nationalist Parties
In this section, we will explore the political expression of nationalist attitudes in the form of rising nationalist political parties. Although there is no clear global trend indicating a shift in attitudes towards nationalism, there has been a rise of nationalist parties and candidates in Europe, as well as some comparable trends in the United States and individual countries elsewhere, such as Japan and India. Thus, this section will answer the question what explains this rise.
In Europe, there has been a long-term trend in rising nationalist parties, in Western Europe discernable since the 1980s (Milačić & Vuković 2017). Elections and referenda in 2016–2017 suggest the strength of nationalist parties, candidates and propositions, but also show that there is not a universal and progressive increase in support for nationalist parties (Aisch, Pearce, & Rousseau, 2017).
Overall, far-right parties have been significant gains in Europe in recent years. In 2016, the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) candidate Norbert Hofer gained 46.2% in the presidential elections, and Marine Le Pen of the Front National (FN) won 33.9% in the second round of French presidential elections in May 2017. Similarly, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) entered the German Bundestag with 12.6% of the vote in September 2017, a first for post-war Germany. The Lega, a party with a far-right platform, running as part of a right of center coalition in the March 2018 Italian election under the leadership of Matteo Salvini emerged as the third largest party in parliament with 17.37% of the popular vote. This trend was, however, not all across the board. In the UK, the nationalist UKIP party lost most support, gaining only 1.8% of votes and no MP, while in the Netherlands the PVV of Geert Wilders emerged as the second largest party, his gains were smaller than widely expected.
The increased support for nationalist parties or candidates and the lack of large-scale shifts in attitudes appears at first contradictory. However, there are two aspects to consider. First, nationalist attitudes did not rise globally, while the rise of nationalist parties and candidates has been regional, focused primarily on Europe and the United States. Second, even when just considering those countries, we cannot observe a long-term shift towards more nationalist attitudes. In countries with rising nationalist politics, we can rather note that polarization and prioritization shifted in support of nationalist candidates.
There are both structural and attitudinal factors that contribute to the electoral basis of nationalist parties. The voters of nationalist parties in developed post-industrial societies—often from working classes—are less well educated and belong to the majority community. They experience uncertainty and often a combination of a real or perceived status reversal and marginalization. This is coupled with racism, authoritarianism and longing for a past that is long gone.2
In the United States, the white working class, which disproportionally supported Trump in the 2016 elections, is more authoritarian (64% have an authoritarian orientation) than the average population, including a support for a leader who breaks the rules. There is a strong belief that the American way of life has deteriorated since the 1950s (65%) and fear that the country is losing its identity and cultures (68%). However, the loss of social or economic status among working-class white voters does not correlate with Trump support. Support was stronger due to particular attitudes, such as perceived discrimination against white Americans, anti-immigrant attitudes and a threat from foreign cultures (Cox, Lienesch, & Jones, 2017).3 The voters for Marine Le Pen display comparable features, hailing mostly from a blue-collar background, with limited education and a high level of dissatisfaction with democracy (Stockemer & Amengay, 2015).
Support for radical right parties is not only based on nationalist positions of voters, such as anti-EU and anti-immigrant positions, but also on economic grounds, such as negative perceived economic position, and economic adversity at the country level and preference for redistributing policies (Song, 2016). Research shows that groups that experience real or perceived decline and vulnerability, as well as social marginalization, are more likely to support nationalist policies (Hilije, 2018). Members of groups that experience a status reversal are particularly vulnerable. This can be particularly well identified in Eastern Germany, as it allows for comparison with the Western German population with which it shares many features, including language, and the current political system. The former Socialist Eastern Germany demonstrates that voting for nationalist parties and nationalist violence, such as anti-immigrant attacks are not necessarily a predictor of broader social attitudes. Thus, while anti-immigrant violence is greater in Eastern Germany than in the West, the variation of anti-immigrant attitudes is not significant.
A longitudinal study in Germany of attitudes towards authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant sentiments and towards the Nazi period shows that the overall anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant and authoritarian attitudes did not rise over the past decade, in fact, they mostly declined (). At the same time social polarization and radicalization, i.e. the willingness to use force, has increased (Decker, Kiess, & Brähler, 2016). Thus, other factors have to explain the variation in voting and violence, such as weaker civil society (societal life) and the sense of greater ‘Fraternal relative depravation’ (Michelsen, Przybilla-Voß, Lühmann, Grund, & Hannes & Finkbeiner, 2017, 27). The concept of ‘Fraternal relative deprivation’ describes the discontent of members of a group arising from the perceived disadvantage an individual is suffering for being a member of this group, in comparison to others, be they West German, foreigners or elites (Singer, 1992).
Figure 10. Measures of nationalism in Germany (Decker et al., 2016)
A key structural cause of nationalism is a multi-dimensional sense of marginalization. In a study of local dynamics in Eastern Germany that have facilitated far-right support and violence, these include rural (or semi-rural) vs. more privileged urban centers, the sense of marginalization as East vs. West Germans and finally the sense of being disadvantaged as Germans over foreigners, in particular refugees. Furthermore, the study finds great importance in authoritarian and ethnocentric worldviews stemming from the socialist period, as well as a depoliticized environment (Michelsen et al., 2017, 191–195).
Finally, the electoral success of politicians who also have a nationalist background should not be seen as a measure of nationalist sentiment. For example, Narendra Modi was elected in a landslide on the nationalist BJP ticket in 2014 in Indian general elections and has remained popular. However, the basis for his support has been less due to the Hindu nationalism of his party, but rather the economic and social platform. The election campaign was marked by a deliberate discursive shift of the BJP away from its earlier Hindu nationalism (Chakravartty & Roy, 2015). Furthermore, the electoral victory came after an extensive period of declining riots in India (Varshney, 2014). Thus, citizens have viewed his policies on communal relations, or his handling of relations with Pakistan less positively than other policies, yet these would have been the policy areas in which nationalist policies would be expected resonate well (Stokes, 2015). This suggests that in this case, popularity is grounded in economic policy, rather than support for nationalism.
In this section, we will explore the political expression of nationalist attitudes in the form of rising nationalist political parties. Although there is no clear global trend indicating a shift in attitudes towards nationalism, there has been a rise of nationalist parties and candidates in Europe, as well as some comparable trends in the United States and individual countries elsewhere, such as Japan and India. Thus, this section will answer the question what explains this rise.
In Europe, there has been a long-term trend in rising nationalist parties, in Western Europe discernable since the 1980s (Milačić & Vuković 2017). Elections and referenda in 2016–2017 suggest the strength of nationalist parties, candidates and propositions, but also show that there is not a universal and progressive increase in support for nationalist parties (Aisch, Pearce, & Rousseau, 2017).
Overall, far-right parties have been significant gains in Europe in recent years. In 2016, the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) candidate Norbert Hofer gained 46.2% in the presidential elections, and Marine Le Pen of the Front National (FN) won 33.9% in the second round of French presidential elections in May 2017. Similarly, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) entered the German Bundestag with 12.6% of the vote in September 2017, a first for post-war Germany. The Lega, a party with a far-right platform, running as part of a right of center coalition in the March 2018 Italian election under the leadership of Matteo Salvini emerged as the third largest party in parliament with 17.37% of the popular vote. This trend was, however, not all across the board. In the UK, the nationalist UKIP party lost most support, gaining only 1.8% of votes and no MP, while in the Netherlands the PVV of Geert Wilders emerged as the second largest party, his gains were smaller than widely expected.
The increased support for nationalist parties or candidates and the lack of large-scale shifts in attitudes appears at first contradictory. However, there are two aspects to consider. First, nationalist attitudes did not rise globally, while the rise of nationalist parties and candidates has been regional, focused primarily on Europe and the United States. Second, even when just considering those countries, we cannot observe a long-term shift towards more nationalist attitudes. In countries with rising nationalist politics, we can rather note that polarization and prioritization shifted in support of nationalist candidates.
There are both structural and attitudinal factors that contribute to the electoral basis of nationalist parties. The voters of nationalist parties in developed post-industrial societies—often from working classes—are less well educated and belong to the majority community. They experience uncertainty and often a combination of a real or perceived status reversal and marginalization. This is coupled with racism, authoritarianism and longing for a past that is long gone.2
In the United States, the white working class, which disproportionally supported Trump in the 2016 elections, is more authoritarian (64% have an authoritarian orientation) than the average population, including a support for a leader who breaks the rules. There is a strong belief that the American way of life has deteriorated since the 1950s (65%) and fear that the country is losing its identity and cultures (68%). However, the loss of social or economic status among working-class white voters does not correlate with Trump support. Support was stronger due to particular attitudes, such as perceived discrimination against white Americans, anti-immigrant attitudes and a threat from foreign cultures (Cox, Lienesch, & Jones, 2017).3 The voters for Marine Le Pen display comparable features, hailing mostly from a blue-collar background, with limited education and a high level of dissatisfaction with democracy (Stockemer & Amengay, 2015).
Support for radical right parties is not only based on nationalist positions of voters, such as anti-EU and anti-immigrant positions, but also on economic grounds, such as negative perceived economic position, and economic adversity at the country level and preference for redistributing policies (Song, 2016). Research shows that groups that experience real or perceived decline and vulnerability, as well as social marginalization, are more likely to support nationalist policies (Hilije, 2018). Members of groups that experience a status reversal are particularly vulnerable. This can be particularly well identified in Eastern Germany, as it allows for comparison with the Western German population with which it shares many features, including language, and the current political system. The former Socialist Eastern Germany demonstrates that voting for nationalist parties and nationalist violence, such as anti-immigrant attacks are not necessarily a predictor of broader social attitudes. Thus, while anti-immigrant violence is greater in Eastern Germany than in the West, the variation of anti-immigrant attitudes is not significant.
A longitudinal study in Germany of attitudes towards authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant sentiments and towards the Nazi period shows that the overall anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant and authoritarian attitudes did not rise over the past decade, in fact, they mostly declined (). At the same time social polarization and radicalization, i.e. the willingness to use force, has increased (Decker, Kiess, & Brähler, 2016). Thus, other factors have to explain the variation in voting and violence, such as weaker civil society (societal life) and the sense of greater ‘Fraternal relative depravation’ (Michelsen, Przybilla-Voß, Lühmann, Grund, & Hannes & Finkbeiner, 2017, 27). The concept of ‘Fraternal relative deprivation’ describes the discontent of members of a group arising from the perceived disadvantage an individual is suffering for being a member of this group, in comparison to others, be they West German, foreigners or elites (Singer, 1992).
Figure 10. Measures of nationalism in Germany (Decker et al., 2016)
A key structural cause of nationalism is a multi-dimensional sense of marginalization. In a study of local dynamics in Eastern Germany that have facilitated far-right support and violence, these include rural (or semi-rural) vs. more privileged urban centers, the sense of marginalization as East vs. West Germans and finally the sense of being disadvantaged as Germans over foreigners, in particular refugees. Furthermore, the study finds great importance in authoritarian and ethnocentric worldviews stemming from the socialist period, as well as a depoliticized environment (Michelsen et al., 2017, 191–195).
Finally, the electoral success of politicians who also have a nationalist background should not be seen as a measure of nationalist sentiment. For example, Narendra Modi was elected in a landslide on the nationalist BJP ticket in 2014 in Indian general elections and has remained popular. However, the basis for his support has been less due to the Hindu nationalism of his party, but rather the economic and social platform. The election campaign was marked by a deliberate discursive shift of the BJP away from its earlier Hindu nationalism (Chakravartty & Roy, 2015). Furthermore, the electoral victory came after an extensive period of declining riots in India (Varshney, 2014). Thus, citizens have viewed his policies on communal relations, or his handling of relations with Pakistan less positively than other policies, yet these would have been the policy areas in which nationalist policies would be expected resonate well (Stokes, 2015). This suggests that in this case, popularity is grounded in economic policy, rather than support for nationalism.
3.3. Nationalist Policy Shifts
Radical nationalist parties rarely secure elected office. At best, they become part of ruling coalitions. However, the rise of nationalist parties and candidates can shift policies of mainstream parties and larger social debates and attitudes. This section will explore nationalist policies and their context.
Nationalist parties can shift the debate, even if they are not based on broad support. There are discursive practices, i.e. ways in which particular topics, such as the own nation, migrants, minorities or neighboring nations, are discussed in public. These can change when topics are discussed differently in media or public debate. Such a change might be the result of a direct policy of a ruling party—as might be the case in more authoritarian countries—a more gradual change. For example, the debate in Europe about refugees underwent a shift (to varying degrees) from discussing refugees in terms of humanitarian need to refugees as a security threat, associated with terrorist violence or sexual and criminal violence (Vollmer & Karakayali, 2017). The Spiral of Silence suggests that individuals remain silent about their opinion if they perceive them not to be in line with the broader dominant social ideas (Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004). This can silence nationalist or xenophobic views in a social environment that discourages it. However, if there is a discursive shift in the opinions published, those who hold nationalist views might be encouraged to voice their views while critiques might feel an increased need to remain silent (Bursztyn, Georgy & Fiorin, 2017). Such a shift has occurred in the United States and large parts of Europe as a result of key votes (Trump and Brexit) or moments of (perceived) crises, such as the influx of numbers of refugees in Europe in 2015/6.
A key danger arises from nationalism in foreign policy. Based on the importance of identifying an ‘other’ against which to mobilize, this can be another country. The best example is the tense Chinese–Japanese relationship. Disputes are based on competing historical narratives of World War Two, two competing powers, in particular with a rising assertiveness of China and open territorial questions. These tensions in the countries’ foreign policy are also reflected in popular sentiment. Thus, in 2016, 91.6% of Japanese and 76.7% of Chinese had an unfavorable or relatively unfavorable impression of the other nation. These negative views of the other are reflected in a variety of fields, from stereotypes about supposed national character to the past and the current political system (Genron NPO, 2016).
However, they are highly volatile (see ) and depend largely on trigger events. Thus the peak of negative views was in 2013 during the conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between the two countries. Once such an escalation occurs, governments, including in more autocratic regimes can become subject to nationalist pressure groups (Hornby, 2017; Ruan, 2016). Thus, foreign policies are both a result of nationalist sentiment, often willfully incensed by governments and/or media, and shape public perception.
Figure 11. Unfavorable views of the other between China and Japan (Genron NPO, 2016)
Even when populists come to power without much reference to nationalism, it can provide for a useful resource. The electoral upset and rule of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines since 2016 has been marked by populism rather than nationalism. Duterte used his tough-talking style against crime and political opponents, less for a nationalist agenda (Curato, 2017). However, populism is easily re-directed towards a nationalist foe, be it over competing claims with China or over ties with the United States.
Nationalist policies pursued by governments can also not just created conflict and instability in the vicinity, but also serve as a larger model and clearinghouse of nationalist movement, as the case of Russia highlights. Since taking office, Vladimir Putin has been building his domestic legitimacy on nationalism, combined with autocratic control and reestablishing state-power after a decade of weakness following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This nationalist agenda took shape in the second Chechen war and was, at first, mostly directed towards the inside. However, the war with Georgia 2008, as well as rising opposition domestically following elections in 2011 led to a more nationalist policy and a direct confrontation with the West, culminating in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian instigated war in Eastern Ukraine.
Like the United States and the EU have been supporting democracy and the rule of law over the past two decades, Russia appears to have emerged as a champion of global nationalism. Russia under Putin has emerged as an important actor in promoting global far-right nationalist groups and actors, in particular in Europe and the United States. First, Russia serves as a model for far-right groups. As Marine Le Pen stated,
the model that is defended by Vladimir Putin, which is one of reasoned protectionism, looking after the interests of his own country, defending his identity, is one that I like, as long as I can defend this model in my own country. (Brownstein, 2017)
Putin embodies the combination of nationalism, authoritarianism and populism that many far-right nationalist groups aspire to. In recent years, Russia has also clear rejected multi-cultural policies, protection of sexual minorities and otherwise aligned itself with the far right. Second, many parties have sought to establish formal ties with Russia, Putin and the ruling United Russia party. Third, Putin as provided assistance to these movements, both in terms of financial support, such as the well-documented credit to Front National through a Russian backed Czech bank, and through media backing in Russian government outlets as RT and Sputnik (Wesslau, 2016). In addition, Russia might be providing illicit support to such groups and candidates, as it has been alleged in terms of interference in elections in the United States and France.However, Russia as a political actor promoting nationalist parties cannot explain the rise of these parties. Russian media might have served as echo chambers for the ideas the parties promote and the country might have provided important backing, it has not caused the large-scale support for such parties.
Rejection of free trade and the nationalization of industries or resources is often associated with nationalism and has been a hallmark of anti-colonial movements. In Latin America, this movement has been strong in the 2000s with the left-wing governments that built their power base on their opposition to external intervention, anti-imperialism in Venezuela, Bolivia to Argentina (Webber, 2012). Either authoritarian drift, as in Venezuela, or economic and other legitimacy crises have weakened these regimes, even if some have become more virulent in their rhetoric (Rathbone & Schipani, 2015). However, while these movements and governments have combined nationalism with left-wing populism, the nationalism was based on genuine grievances with foreign, in particular US intervention and economic dominance. Economic nationalism highlights that nationalism, as a versatile ideology, can be associated with the political left and right. The left-wing nationalism widespread in Latin America often directed against an external others, be it the United States or particular cooperation. This movement had its key wave well before the global economic crisis and was largely connected to the failure of the neoliberal economic reforms of earlier governments (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012).
Radical nationalist parties rarely secure elected office. At best, they become part of ruling coalitions. However, the rise of nationalist parties and candidates can shift policies of mainstream parties and larger social debates and attitudes. This section will explore nationalist policies and their context.
Nationalist parties can shift the debate, even if they are not based on broad support. There are discursive practices, i.e. ways in which particular topics, such as the own nation, migrants, minorities or neighboring nations, are discussed in public. These can change when topics are discussed differently in media or public debate. Such a change might be the result of a direct policy of a ruling party—as might be the case in more authoritarian countries—a more gradual change. For example, the debate in Europe about refugees underwent a shift (to varying degrees) from discussing refugees in terms of humanitarian need to refugees as a security threat, associated with terrorist violence or sexual and criminal violence (Vollmer & Karakayali, 2017). The Spiral of Silence suggests that individuals remain silent about their opinion if they perceive them not to be in line with the broader dominant social ideas (Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004). This can silence nationalist or xenophobic views in a social environment that discourages it. However, if there is a discursive shift in the opinions published, those who hold nationalist views might be encouraged to voice their views while critiques might feel an increased need to remain silent (Bursztyn, Georgy & Fiorin, 2017). Such a shift has occurred in the United States and large parts of Europe as a result of key votes (Trump and Brexit) or moments of (perceived) crises, such as the influx of numbers of refugees in Europe in 2015/6.
A key danger arises from nationalism in foreign policy. Based on the importance of identifying an ‘other’ against which to mobilize, this can be another country. The best example is the tense Chinese–Japanese relationship. Disputes are based on competing historical narratives of World War Two, two competing powers, in particular with a rising assertiveness of China and open territorial questions. These tensions in the countries’ foreign policy are also reflected in popular sentiment. Thus, in 2016, 91.6% of Japanese and 76.7% of Chinese had an unfavorable or relatively unfavorable impression of the other nation. These negative views of the other are reflected in a variety of fields, from stereotypes about supposed national character to the past and the current political system (Genron NPO, 2016).
However, they are highly volatile (see ) and depend largely on trigger events. Thus the peak of negative views was in 2013 during the conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between the two countries. Once such an escalation occurs, governments, including in more autocratic regimes can become subject to nationalist pressure groups (Hornby, 2017; Ruan, 2016). Thus, foreign policies are both a result of nationalist sentiment, often willfully incensed by governments and/or media, and shape public perception.
Figure 11. Unfavorable views of the other between China and Japan (Genron NPO, 2016)
Even when populists come to power without much reference to nationalism, it can provide for a useful resource. The electoral upset and rule of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines since 2016 has been marked by populism rather than nationalism. Duterte used his tough-talking style against crime and political opponents, less for a nationalist agenda (Curato, 2017). However, populism is easily re-directed towards a nationalist foe, be it over competing claims with China or over ties with the United States.
Nationalist policies pursued by governments can also not just created conflict and instability in the vicinity, but also serve as a larger model and clearinghouse of nationalist movement, as the case of Russia highlights. Since taking office, Vladimir Putin has been building his domestic legitimacy on nationalism, combined with autocratic control and reestablishing state-power after a decade of weakness following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This nationalist agenda took shape in the second Chechen war and was, at first, mostly directed towards the inside. However, the war with Georgia 2008, as well as rising opposition domestically following elections in 2011 led to a more nationalist policy and a direct confrontation with the West, culminating in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian instigated war in Eastern Ukraine.
Like the United States and the EU have been supporting democracy and the rule of law over the past two decades, Russia appears to have emerged as a champion of global nationalism. Russia under Putin has emerged as an important actor in promoting global far-right nationalist groups and actors, in particular in Europe and the United States. First, Russia serves as a model for far-right groups. As Marine Le Pen stated,
the model that is defended by Vladimir Putin, which is one of reasoned protectionism, looking after the interests of his own country, defending his identity, is one that I like, as long as I can defend this model in my own country. (Brownstein, 2017)
However, Russia as a political actor promoting nationalist parties cannot explain the rise of these parties. Russian media might have served as echo chambers for the ideas the parties promote and the country might have provided important backing, it has not caused the large-scale support for such parties.
Rejection of free trade and the nationalization of industries or resources is often associated with nationalism and has been a hallmark of anti-colonial movements. In Latin America, this movement has been strong in the 2000s with the left-wing governments that built their power base on their opposition to external intervention, anti-imperialism in Venezuela, Bolivia to Argentina (Webber, 2012). Either authoritarian drift, as in Venezuela, or economic and other legitimacy crises have weakened these regimes, even if some have become more virulent in their rhetoric (Rathbone & Schipani, 2015). However, while these movements and governments have combined nationalism with left-wing populism, the nationalism was based on genuine grievances with foreign, in particular US intervention and economic dominance. Economic nationalism highlights that nationalism, as a versatile ideology, can be associated with the political left and right. The left-wing nationalism widespread in Latin America often directed against an external others, be it the United States or particular cooperation. This movement had its key wave well before the global economic crisis and was largely connected to the failure of the neoliberal economic reforms of earlier governments (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012).
3.4. Nationalist Violence and Hate Crimes
A final look at violence allows us to also incorporate the fourth dimension of nationalism, besides attitudes and political preferences and policies. Virulent exclusionary nationalism has been a key cause of mass violence. This violence can result in pogroms and ‘deadly ethnic riots’ (Horowitz, 2003), in large-scale civil strife or interstate war.
The main type of ethnic violence, besides riots and ethnic conflict, are hate crimes, such as physical attacks, threats and attacks on property.
OSCE hate crime monitoring allows for some insights into trends over time. The difference in data gathering between countries makes cross-country comparisons difficult. Considering trends between 2009 and 2015 (see ), the unweighed average (not accounting for the size of the country) saw an increase, yet this was largely due to a few countries, which note a drastic increase such as Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands. The mean of hate crimes has remained largely the same over this seven-year period and the large countries (United States, UK, Germany, France) have seen a decline or little change over time.
Figure 12. Change in report levels of hate crimes in select countries of the OSCE area, based on 100% at first reporting (OSCE, 2017)
There is emerging evidence that several key events over the past year have triggered a rise in hate crimes. In the UK, the Brexit referendum had a measurable impact on hate crimes. The number of hate crimes rose during the campaign and peaked around the referendum. Although levels dropped subsequently, they remained higher than in previous years. The overall increase was greater than other offenses (Corcoran & Smith, 2016). Thus, the numbers of hate crimes reached the highest level since 2012 in the summer of 2016, a 27% increase over the preceding months (Sharman & Jones, 2017). A similar trend can be observed in the context of the US presidential elections. Preliminary data from urban centers suggest that there has been a significant increase in hate crimes in 2016 over the previous year, however that increase still puts hate crimes at lower levels than following 9/11 in 2001 (Levin, 2017). Overall, hate crimes increased in the 2016 election year steadily, breaking with a more cyclical annual pattern. Rushin and Edward show that this increase is not just correlated to the Trump election campaign, but causally linked so that one can speak of a ‘Trump effect’ (2018).
While it is too early to paint a global picture, there are indications that key polarizing events, such as the Brexit vote, the Trump election and the peak of refugee flows led to an increase in hate crimes. However, these do not necessarily point to an enduring higher level of such crimes. The increase of hate crimes around the Brexit and Trump elections suggest both an increased polarization during the campaign, but also the (perceived) change in social norms that nationalist and xenophobic attitudes have become more acceptable and thus radical individuals and groups feel more empowered to act upon them.
Finally, a key risk of nationalism is the increase in ethnic conflict, as had been the case during the nationalist wave in the early 1990s. What is commonly called ‘ethnic conflict’ is often closely enmeshed with other causes, including ideology, religion, external actors or political groups competing for power or resources. Some scholars have argued that greed and structrual causes, such as geography and demography, are better at explaining conflict than grievance and identity-based factors (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). Yet, conflicts that involve group identities—be they religion, ethnicity and nation—are often more enduring, violent and harder to settle. Furthermore, while structural features might increase the likelihood of conflict and provide for an important contributing factor, identity constitutes an important legitimzing factor—few insurgencies or wars are begun in the name of self-enrichment or to keep unemployed young men busy. Ethnic violence is also a generative force of identity (Bergholz, 2016). Thus ethnic violence begets more ethnic violence. Of course, there is nothing inevitable or deterministic about this, but large-scale violence creates trauma, divisions and political polarisation that increases the likelihood of future violence. Group violence often enforces group identity and makes other forms of political identification more difficult.
With this in mind, we can observe that after a peak of ethnic violence in the early 1990s, there has been a considerable decline since—less pronounced in cases of ethnic violence (lower intensity than war), bottoming out in the middle of the last decade. There has been a slight increase since, but still well below the levels of the early 1990s, which included Genocide in Rwanda, the post-Yugoslav wars, and Somalia (as shows). The decline, however, is not a predictor of future trends in ethnic violence.
Figure 13. Trends in armed conflict (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2015)
A final look at violence allows us to also incorporate the fourth dimension of nationalism, besides attitudes and political preferences and policies. Virulent exclusionary nationalism has been a key cause of mass violence. This violence can result in pogroms and ‘deadly ethnic riots’ (Horowitz, 2003), in large-scale civil strife or interstate war.
The main type of ethnic violence, besides riots and ethnic conflict, are hate crimes, such as physical attacks, threats and attacks on property.
OSCE hate crime monitoring allows for some insights into trends over time. The difference in data gathering between countries makes cross-country comparisons difficult. Considering trends between 2009 and 2015 (see ), the unweighed average (not accounting for the size of the country) saw an increase, yet this was largely due to a few countries, which note a drastic increase such as Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands. The mean of hate crimes has remained largely the same over this seven-year period and the large countries (United States, UK, Germany, France) have seen a decline or little change over time.
Figure 12. Change in report levels of hate crimes in select countries of the OSCE area, based on 100% at first reporting (OSCE, 2017)
There is emerging evidence that several key events over the past year have triggered a rise in hate crimes. In the UK, the Brexit referendum had a measurable impact on hate crimes. The number of hate crimes rose during the campaign and peaked around the referendum. Although levels dropped subsequently, they remained higher than in previous years. The overall increase was greater than other offenses (Corcoran & Smith, 2016). Thus, the numbers of hate crimes reached the highest level since 2012 in the summer of 2016, a 27% increase over the preceding months (Sharman & Jones, 2017). A similar trend can be observed in the context of the US presidential elections. Preliminary data from urban centers suggest that there has been a significant increase in hate crimes in 2016 over the previous year, however that increase still puts hate crimes at lower levels than following 9/11 in 2001 (Levin, 2017). Overall, hate crimes increased in the 2016 election year steadily, breaking with a more cyclical annual pattern. Rushin and Edward show that this increase is not just correlated to the Trump election campaign, but causally linked so that one can speak of a ‘Trump effect’ (2018).
While it is too early to paint a global picture, there are indications that key polarizing events, such as the Brexit vote, the Trump election and the peak of refugee flows led to an increase in hate crimes. However, these do not necessarily point to an enduring higher level of such crimes. The increase of hate crimes around the Brexit and Trump elections suggest both an increased polarization during the campaign, but also the (perceived) change in social norms that nationalist and xenophobic attitudes have become more acceptable and thus radical individuals and groups feel more empowered to act upon them.
Finally, a key risk of nationalism is the increase in ethnic conflict, as had been the case during the nationalist wave in the early 1990s. What is commonly called ‘ethnic conflict’ is often closely enmeshed with other causes, including ideology, religion, external actors or political groups competing for power or resources. Some scholars have argued that greed and structrual causes, such as geography and demography, are better at explaining conflict than grievance and identity-based factors (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). Yet, conflicts that involve group identities—be they religion, ethnicity and nation—are often more enduring, violent and harder to settle. Furthermore, while structural features might increase the likelihood of conflict and provide for an important contributing factor, identity constitutes an important legitimzing factor—few insurgencies or wars are begun in the name of self-enrichment or to keep unemployed young men busy. Ethnic violence is also a generative force of identity (Bergholz, 2016). Thus ethnic violence begets more ethnic violence. Of course, there is nothing inevitable or deterministic about this, but large-scale violence creates trauma, divisions and political polarisation that increases the likelihood of future violence. Group violence often enforces group identity and makes other forms of political identification more difficult.
With this in mind, we can observe that after a peak of ethnic violence in the early 1990s, there has been a considerable decline since—less pronounced in cases of ethnic violence (lower intensity than war), bottoming out in the middle of the last decade. There has been a slight increase since, but still well below the levels of the early 1990s, which included Genocide in Rwanda, the post-Yugoslav wars, and Somalia (as shows). The decline, however, is not a predictor of future trends in ethnic violence.
Figure 13. Trends in armed conflict (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2015)
4. Conclusions
There is no clear global trend that would suggest a rise of nationalism, but instead, there has been a rise of nationalist politics in some countries, either expressed by the rise of new parties, the electoral success of nationalist candidates or the shift of public discourse of established parties. This trend is neither uniform nor universal. However, this does not signal that there is no reason for concern. Further exogenous shocks can increase the significance of nationalism; nationalisms through their inherently confrontational structure can also mutually increase tensions and conflict. The structural causes of nationalism are deeply engrained and not easily changed. The global economic crisis has been one contributing factor to the rise of nationalism in countries where particular groups feel disadvantaged and fear or experience a loss of status.
Nationalist parties have been less able to draw on increase nationalist sentiment rather than on a number of exogenous factors, including a sense of polarization and marginalization of their electorate. The puzzle remaining is the reasons for their timing. Why would such parties succeed across different countries? Research on social movement suggests that either contagion—the uncoordinated spread of ideas; diffusion—the organized communication of ideas; or simultaneity—the same structural conditions causing similar outcomes (Tarrow,
2006, 209–211). While the global economic crisis did have effects across the world, the economic performance among countries with strong nationalist parties varies greatly. Yet, (perceived) of status reversal and loss among the (former) working class in post-industrial countries does provide a plausible similarity for this wave. There has also been a dimension of contagion and diffusion. Diffusion could be seen through a populist/nationalist international, with leaders of nationalist parties and groups meeting, epitomized by the visit of former UKIP leader Nigel Farage to Donald Trump after his elections as president. Yet the victory of Brexit or Trump might have discouraged the success of nationalist projects in continental Europe. Success can thus also be discouraging, not just contagious.
The democratic backsliding around the world, from Hungary to Turkey, from Venezuela to the United States has repercussions for nationalism. Less democratic regimes are more likely to use nationalism. They are more in need to shore up legitimacy—especially when economies fail to perform—and they are more able to direct public opinion. Furthermore, modern autocracies usually have to perform at the ballot box. Few un-democratic governments have no elections. Thus, nationalism provides often for an easy and dangerous resource. Considering the link between authoritarianism, populism and nationalism, these phenomena need to be considered jointly. Thus, strategies reducing populism politics or authoritarian structures and attitudes are likely to have positive effects on nationalism.
There is no panacea for nationalism as long as it is endemic to the global social system. However, there are strategies to reduce its exclusionary and virulent side. As this study suggests, the manifestations of nationalism are manifold, thus the response has to be as well.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Sara Božičević and Richard L. Roden for their research assistance.
4. Categories indicated no (very much or at all). Based on the World Values Survey Wave 5 & 6. Countries not included in both waves are excluded. Average gives the same weight to all countries.
5. The question was not asked in all countries throughout the period. Question: The country should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their own problems (as best they can) http://www.pewglobal.org
6. Citizens in the sub-Saharan African countries who indicate that they only or more member of an ethnic group than of state. “I feel more (ethnic group) than (national identity)” or “I feel only (ethnic group)”. Only countries which were included in the survey all three waves were included.
7. Conflict with Western Values based on those who mostly or partly agree to question "There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West." Superiority is based on questions% who completely or mostly agree with the statement, “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others” (Pew Research Center,
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