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Three days before the midterms, election officials are confronting new cyber threats with substantially less federal protection. The contradiction raises a question the White House has yet to satisfactorily answer.
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Donald Trump has spent years warning Americans that their elections are vulnerable to hacking. He has repeatedly questioned the security of electronic voting machines, alleged that computer systems were manipulated to steal elections, and insisted that protecting the integrity of American elections is among his highest priorities. In a nationally televised primetime address on July 16, he warned of “shocking vulnerabilities in our election infrastructure,” claimed that voting machines and ballot-counting systems were exposed to hacking and manipulation, and declared that the threat was so serious that urgent action was necessary to protect American elections.
Yet since returning to the White House in January 2025, his administration has systematically reduced the federal government’s ability to defend those very elections against cyberattacks.
It has suspended cybersecurity programs, eliminated funding for a nationwide election-security information-sharing network, removed experienced personnel, and disrupted partnerships between federal cybersecurity specialists and state election officials.
And now, with the midterm elections just three days away, those decisions are having consequences.
In a report published Saturday morning, October 31, the Washington Post describes election officials scrambling to respond to newly discovered computer vulnerabilities that could expose election infrastructure to cyberattacks.
Arizona’s chief election information security officer, Michael Moore, described preparations for Election Day in unusually stark terms.
“I am planning for Election Day disruption. We are planning as if there will definitely be a cyberattack.”
The article notes almost in passing that the Trump administration has sharply curtailed federal efforts to secure elections.
That passing observation deserves considerably more attention.
Because it raises an obvious question: Why would a president who repeatedly warns that American elections can be compromised deliberately reduce the government’s capacity to prevent precisely that from happening?
The answer takes us into the aftermath of the 2020 election, the dismantling of a federal agency Trump himself created, and an extraordinary recent investigation revealing that Trump administration officials wanted government cybersecurity specialists to secretly hack a voting machine.
The Election Security System Trump Created—and Then Dismantled
Following Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, the federal government recognized that protecting election infrastructure required a coordinated national effort.
In 2017, election systems were designated critical infrastructure. In 2018, during Trump’s first administration, Congress established the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, within the Department of Homeland Security.
CISA became the federal government’s principal partner in helping state and local election officials defend their systems against cyber threats.
The agency provided vulnerability assessments, technical assistance, threat intelligence, and emergency cybersecurity support. It helped election administrators identify weaknesses before attackers could exploit them.
It also operated through a nationwide network of election security advisers who developed working relationships with officials responsible for administering elections in thousands of jurisdictions.
The arrangement reflected a practical reality.
Although American elections are administered locally, cyber threats are national and frequently international. A county election office cannot independently monitor Russian intelligence operations, analyze sophisticated malware, or maintain the cybersecurity capabilities of a federal intelligence agency.
CISA helped bridge that gap.
During 2023 and 2024, the agency conducted more than 700 cybersecurity assessments for local election jurisdictions.
Then Trump returned to office.
Beginning in February 2025, the administration suspended CISA’s election-security activities while reviewing the agency’s mission.
Employees specializing in election security were placed on leave, reassigned, or dismissed. ProPublica subsequently reported that approximately three dozen specialists responsible for election-related activities had been removed from those positions.
In March 2025, the administration terminated funding for the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, known as EI-ISAC.
The program had provided state and local election officials with free access to cybersecurity threat information, warnings, training, and technical assistance.
Without federal support, some services continued under a paid membership model. But election offices unable to afford those services lost access to resources previously available nationwide.
The reductions extended beyond election-specific programs. According to congressional documents, CISA lost approximately one-third of its overall workforce during 2025.
This was not merely a change in administrative priorities. It represented a substantial reduction in the personnel, institutional relationships, and operational capabilities that had supported election cybersecurity for years.
What Happens When the Federal Government Withdraws?
The consequences are becoming apparent as Election Day approaches.
In Arizona, Michael Moore says his state has not had a dedicated CISA cybersecurity adviser since March 2025.
In previous elections, that adviser was a trusted contact who could immediately communicate intelligence about emerging threats.
The importance of that relationship becomes clearer when something goes wrong.
Last week, cybersecurity researchers identified a serious vulnerability affecting PHP, a programming language widely used to operate websites and online services.
Election officials in Arizona and Florida suddenly faced the need to patch or temporarily disable vulnerable systems.
This was particularly difficult because election administrators ordinarily impose a freeze on changes to computer systems during the final 45 days before an election. The objective is to prevent last-minute modifications from inadvertently creating new problems.
The newly identified vulnerability forced officials to interrupt those precautions.
In Florida, a company providing technology services to local election offices temporarily suspended certain public-facing services while addressing the problem.
The immediate disruptions were limited, and there is no evidence that votes were altered. But the incident demonstrated how quickly an emerging vulnerability can create problems immediately before an election.
It also demonstrated why election officials value a reliable national cybersecurity network.
Washington Secretary of State Steve Hobbs described the problem to the Post:
“We can’t keep just using duct tape and Bondo to keep this car going.”
For small election offices with limited staff and budgets, the loss of federal assistance can be particularly consequential.
The danger is not limited to someone hacking a voting machine and changing vote totals.
Cyberattacks can disable voter-registration databases, interfere with electronic poll books, disrupt election websites, compromise administrative systems, or prevent the timely reporting of results.
Such attacks could cause serious disruption and confusion without altering a single ballot.
And, in an election already surrounded by allegations of fraud, disruption itself could undermine public confidence.
Congress Provided $39.6 Million. What Happened to It?
Perhaps the most revealing development involves money Congress specifically designated for election security.
Six monthd before the midterms, in April 2026, Congress approved homeland security appropriations accompanied by instructions providing $39.61 million for CISA’s election-security program.
The congressional report specifically identified the continuation of regional election security advisers and the EI-ISAC information-sharing network.
Yet months later, the administration had not restored funding to that network.
On September 3, Senator Alex Padilla of California and Representative Joe Morelle of New York formally challenged the Department of Homeland Security over the situation.
Their letter pointed out that Congress had directed the continuation of election-security activities and demanded an explanation for the failure to restore the funding.
They requested a response by September 9. As of today, October 31, 2026, I can find no evidence of a response.
The congressional dispute raises a question that should have a straightforward answer.
Congress designated money to help protect American elections. Why has the administration not restored the cybersecurity network Congress specifically identified for continued support?
The administration has also proposed eliminating CISA’s dedicated election-security program in its fiscal 2027 budget.
That proposal has not become law. But it suggests that the reductions are not simply a temporary reorganization.
They reflect a continuing policy direction.
Why Is Trump Doing This?
To understand the administration’s decisions, we need to return to November 2020.
Does the name Christopher Krebs ring a bell?
CISA was then headed by Christopher Krebs, a cybersecurity specialist Trump had appointed.
Following the presidential election, as Trump was claiming Biden stole the election, Krebs and other election-security officials publicly defended the integrity of the nation’s voting systems.
Trump fired Krebs on November 17, 2020.
The confrontation established CISA as an institution that, in Trump’s view, had taken a position against him on one of the most important political controversies of his career.
But there was a second controversy.
During the 2020 election cycle, CISA also participated in efforts to identify and counter election misinformation. Its activities included communicating with technology companies and other organizations about misleading election-related claims.
Trump and his allies accused the agency of participating in censorship of conservative political speech.
Those allegations became an important element of the broader conservative campaign against federal involvement in policing misinformation.
When Trump returned to office, his administration characterized CISA as an agency that had strayed beyond its legitimate cybersecurity responsibilities.
A Department of Homeland Security spokesperson told ProPublica that the agency’s previous expansion had concealed a departure from its statutory mission, including political activity rather than the defense of critical infrastructure.
This is the administration’s principal explanation: CISA needed to be redirected toward its proper responsibilities.
It also argued that certain federally funded cybersecurity services were duplicative and that eliminating them would allow resources to be concentrated on essential functions.
But this explanation raises another question.
Why did eliminating activities the administration considered political also require dismantling programs devoted to identifying hackers, detecting vulnerabilities, and protecting election computer systems?
Monitoring election misinformation and defending a county election office against a ransomware attack are fundamentally different activities.
One involves questions about government speech, political expression, and potential censorship.
The other involves preventing unauthorized access to computer systems.
The administration has offered no meaningful explanation as to why objections to the former required substantial reductions in the latter.
Then Came an Extraordinary Request: Hack a Voting Machine
On October 19, ProPublica published an investigation by Andy Mannix and Doug Bock Clark that adds another dimension to this story.
According to two former administration officials, political appointees at the Department of Homeland Security instructed CISA personnel in the spring of 2025, a few months into Trump’s second term, to secretly obtain a voting machine, attempt to hack it, and provide their findings to the White House.
There was an additional element that troubled career cybersecurity specialists.
According to the investigation, the appointees did not want the voting-machine manufacturer notified if vulnerabilities were discovered.
That would have departed from ordinary cybersecurity practice, under which identifying a vulnerability is generally followed by notifying the affected organization so it can be corrected.
The employees resisted the request.
They reportedly explained that carrying it out was not feasible, partly because specialists capable of undertaking such work had recently been dismissed through the administration’s personnel reductions.
The proposal was eventually abandoned.
But consider what this episode tells us.
At the same time that the administration was reducing the federal government’s established capacity to help states protect election systems, political appointees wanted the agency to conduct a secret operation to determine whether a voting machine could be hacked, and to report that information to the White House, and to NOT report that information to the manufacturer.
The reported secrecy, the proposed withholding of findings from the manufacturer, and the intended delivery of the results to the White House and nowhere else raised concerns among career officials.
One former official told ProPublica that they feared any discovered vulnerability might be retained for use in challenging election results.
Darker scenarios were also discussed as to how the Trump White House might use the knowledge of how to hack a voting machine—knowledge that had intentionally been provided only to the White House and withheled from the manufacturer.
What Does the Administration Say Now?
The Trump administration disputes the suggestion that it has abandoned election cybersecurity.
On September 24, CISA released a new election infrastructure security plan promising continued technical assistance, vulnerability scanning, information sharing, and coordination with state election officials.
Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin declared that election security is a national security responsibility and said the plan would be fully implemented.
Under the revised arrangement, CISA’s ten regional directors are serving as election-security advisers, and state officials can request technical support through regional offices.
The plan did not identify restored staffing levels; it did not reinstate the previous dedicated adviser structure; nor did it explain how the promised services would be supported if the administration’s proposed elimination of dedicated election-security funding takes effect.
And election officials say that restoring relationships just weeks before an election does not replace the months of preparation that were lost.
Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes has expressed particular frustration with the administration’s attempts to rebuild cooperation after earlier reductions.
The administration maintains that its remaining resources are sufficient. State officials who previously relied on the eliminated programs dispute that assessment.
Both positions deserve consideration, but the practical question is whether election administrators have the expertise, intelligence, and assistance they need when an actual threat emerges.
Three Days Before the Election, the Contradiction Remains
An administration that repeatedly warns of election hacking has eliminated or weakened important federal programs designed to prevent it.
It has withdrawn financial support from a nationwide threat-sharing network, displaced experienced election-security specialists, and disrupted established partnerships with state governments.
It has proposed eliminating the dedicated election-security program altogether.
And when Congress designated money to maintain critical services, the administration faced formal demands from lawmakers to explain why the services had not been restored.
Meanwhile, according to ProPublica, political appointees were interested in secretly testing whether voting machines could be hacked.
The administration’s actions have raised serious questions about whether that objective has received the priority its own warnings would seem to demand.
And with Americans already voting in the 2026 midterms, the question is no longer theoretical.
If Donald Trump believes cyberattacks pose such a serious threat to American elections, why has his administration spent nearly two years reducing some of the government’s most important defenses against them?
It is a question the White House should answer directly.
Happy Halloween — have a great weekend.
SOURCES
https://www.propublica.org/
https://www.propublica.org/
https://www.propublica.org/
https://www.appropriations.
https://apnews.com/article/
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/
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