1). “Washington Attacks Key Element of Russia’s Nuclear Umbrella Threatening Entire Global Nuclear Security Architecture”, May 26, 2024, Mike Whitney, Unz Review, at < https://www.unz.com/mwhitney/
2). “Strike On Russian Strategic Early Warning Radar Site Is A Big Deal: Russia losing a strategic early warning radar system is a new twist in the Ukraine conflict that could have further reaching ramifications”, May 24, 2024, Joseph Trevithick, The War Zone, at < https://www.twz.com/news-
3). “Ukraine attacked key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella — Russian senator: The US is so deeply involved in the conflict that it likely knew about Kiev’s plans, Senator Dmitry Rogozin says”, May 25, 2024, Anon, RT, at < https://swentr.site/russia/
4). “Pantsir Air Defense Systems Appear On Moscow Rooftops: New air defenses on top of Russia’s Ministry of Defense headquarters and another building likely point to concerns about Ukrainian strikes”, Jan 19, 2023, Joseph Trevithick, The War Zone, at < https://www.twz.com/pantsir-
5). “Nuclear Experts On Chances Of Russia Using Atomic Weapons In Ukraine: We asked top experts about the chances that an increasingly desperate Russia could use nuclear weapons to change its losing hand in Ukraine”, Sep 30, 2022, Tyler Rogoway, The War Zone, at < https://www.twz.com/nuclear-
~~ recommended by dmorista ~~
Introduction by dmorista: I want to acknowledge that dreamjoehill2 alerted me to the important article posted here as Item 1)., “Washington Attacks Key Element ….”. That article, posted at The Unz Review opens with this paragraph:
“The Biden administration, using its proxy forces in Ukraine, launched an unprecedented attack on 'a key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella' on Thursday effectively blinding the Russian military from detecting incoming nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. 'Satellite imagery confirms' that multiple drones severely damaged 'a Russian strategic early warning radar site in the southwestern end of the country' leaving Moscow more vulnerable to enemy attack. The western media has largely blacked-out any coverage of the incident which should have been presented in headlines across the country. According to Russian nuclear doctrine, any attack on Russia’s essential nuclear first-alert system provides a justification for nuclear retaliation. Given the gravity of the situation we must assume that Washington’s frustration with Ukraine’s performance on the battlefield has precipitated a dramatic change in policy that includes high-risk provocations aimed at triggering an overreaction that leads to direct NATO intervention. Clearly, the Biden administration has decided that it cannot prevail in Ukraine absent NATO involvement. To that end, the US—via its proxies in Ukraine—will continue to launch increasingly lethal attacks on Russian territory forcing Moscow to respond in kind.” (Emphasis in original)
Near the end of the article this statement is posted:
“It’s also worth noting (as one analyst said)
“It’s not like Ukraine bought American long-range missiles and the US has restricted their use. The CIA tells Zelensky to demand American missiles provided at no cost, shipped to Ukraine by the USA, prepared and fired by American contractors using intel provided by the CIA to hit targets in Russia that have little involvement in the war. (Emphasis added)
“In short—despite the illusion of Ukrainian 'proxies'—these attacks on Russia are 100% American concocted, enabled and implemented. The culpability is Washington’s alone and the Russians know it.”
In Item 2)., “Strike On Russian Strategic Early Warning ….”, there is some substantive discussion of the ramifications of damaging Russia's strategic early warning radar system. This early warning radar system functions to detect incoming Ballistic Missiles carrying nuclear warheads; at the range around Crimea, Western Russia, and southern Ukraine (where the radar site is located) it cannot see anything below 20 Kilometers of altitude. This agrees with the analysis in Item 1). that questions the motivations of Ukrainians for making such an attack. The website The War Zone where Item 2). appears is blatantly pro US / NATO but does address some of the real concerns that the Corporate Controlled Media in the U.S. blank out or otherwise ignore. Item 3)., “Ukraine attacked key element ….”, is from RT, a Russian Government sponsored website and is a short post that agrees with The Unz Review's point of view.
Item 4)., “Pantsir Air Defense Systems ….”, and Item 5)., “Nuclear Experts On Chances ….” are both from The War Zone, and obviously share in the anti-Russian pro-U.S. / NATO point of view. But still contain some useful information about the background to the current dangerous situation, following the attack on the Russian Strategic Early Warning Radar System.
We all should be concerned that if these sorts of attacks on Russian Strategic Early Warning continue that the Russians, in accordance with warnings and policies they have made abundantly clear, might feel it necessary to use tactical nuclear weapons against the Ukrainian forces. That could easily escalate into a generalized nuclear war.
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Washington attacks key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella threatening entire global nuclear security architecture
Washington’s “deep involvement in the armed conflict and total control over Kiev’s military planning means that the claims that the US does not know about Ukrainian plans to strike Russia’s missile defense system can be discarded.” Russian Senator Dmitry Rogozin
The Biden administration, using its proxy forces in Ukraine, launched an unprecedented attack on “a key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella” on Thursday effectively blinding the Russian military from detecting incoming nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. “Satellite imagery confirms” that multiple drones severely damaged “a Russian strategic early warning radar site in the southwestern end of the country” leaving Moscow more vulnerable to enemy attack. The western media has largely blacked-out any coverage of the incident which should have been presented in headlines across the country. According to Russian nuclear doctrine, any attack on Russia’s essential nuclear first-alert system provides a justification for nuclear retaliation. Given the gravity of the situation we must assume that Washington’s frustration with Ukraine’s performance on the battlefield has precipitated a dramatic change in policy that includes high-risk provocations aimed at triggering an overreaction that leads to direct NATO intervention. Clearly, the Biden administration has decided that it cannot prevail in Ukraine absent NATO involvement. To that end, the US—via its proxies in Ukraine—will continue to launch increasingly lethal attacks on Russian territory forcing Moscow to respond in kind. This is from an article at The Warzone:
Satellite imagery confirms a Russian strategic early warning radar site in the southwestern end of the country was substantially damaged in a reported Ukrainian drone attack earlier this week. This looks to be a first-of-its-kind attack on a site linked to Russia’s general strategic defense. As such, it points to a new and worrisome dimension to the conflict, especially when it comes to the potential use of nuclear weapons….
(Satellite imagery) shows severe damage to both structures housing the Voronezh-DMs at Armavir. There is also clear evidence of multiple hits on the radar buildings. …(The) radar arrays are generally very sensitive and fragile systems, and even relatively limited damage can result in a “mission kill,” rendering them inoperable for an extended period of time….
Since receiving a new tranche of ATACMS ( Army Tactical Missile System) in secret earlier this year, the Ukrainian armed forces have been using those weapons to good effect against Russian air bases, air defense nodes, and other targets. The latest batch of ATACMS are also longer-range versions than had previously been delivered to Ukraine’s military, which have allowed them to hold more targets at risk….
The two Voronezh-DMs at the facility are a key part of Russia’s larger strategic early warning network and their loss, even temporarily, could only degrade the country’s ability to detect incoming nuclear threats. There are also concerns about how this could impact the ability of Russia’s overall strategic warning network to evaluate potential threats and eliminate false positives due to possible loss of overlapping coverage in certain areas. Strike On Russian Strategic Early Warning Radar Site Is A Big Deal, The Warzone
We should assume that the plan to strike the facility was concocted and authorized at the highest level of government, perhaps, President Biden himself. Certainly, no low-ranking officer would risk his own career and possible court martial on a venture so audacious and potentially catastrophic. Also, the fact that the media has largely swept this blockbuster story under the rug suggests that corporate journalists are, once again, colluding with government officials to prevent Washington’s transgressions from being revealed to the public. Aside from slandering any and all opponents of US foreign policy, the media’s primary duty is concealing the crimes of the state.(which are too numerous to count.) Here’s more from The Warzone:
Russia’s early warning network is part of the country’s broader nuclear deterrent posture.
“The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation” include any “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions,” according to the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence the Kremlin put out two years ago.
All of this follows the start of tactical nuclear drills by Russian forces in the country’s Southern Military District, which borders Ukraine, on Tuesday. Strike On Russian Strategic Early Warning Radar Site Is A Big Deal, The Warzone
The attack on a critical Russian nuclear defense facility—that could serve as a pretext for a nuclear exchange—shows that we have entered a new and more dangerous phase of Washington’s war on Russia. It’s clear that the public debate concerning the use of long-range missiles to strike deep into Russian territory, is largely a hoax intended to convince the American people that the matter will be decided by their elected representatives after an exhaustive debate. But it won’t be. As we can see, the train has already left the station. The decision to provoke a war with Russia has already been made, and that policy is being implemented as we speak.
It’s also worth noting (as one analyst said)
It’s not like Ukraine bought American long-range missiles and the US has restricted their use. The CIA tells Zelensky to demand American missiles provided at no cost, shipped to Ukraine by the USA, prepared and fired by American contractors using intel provided by the CIA to hit targets in Russia that have little involvement in the war.
In short—despite the illusion of Ukrainian “proxies”—these attacks on Russia are 100% American concocted, enabled and implemented. The culpability is Washington’s alone and the Russians know it. This is from RT:
The US is directly responsible for a Ukrainian strike on a key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella, Senator Dmitry Rogozin said, warning that such attacks could lead to the collapse of the entire global nuclear security architecture…Rogozin suggested that it was extremely unlikely that the strike, which Ukrainian media reported involved several drones, was carried out at Kiev’s sole initiative and without US involvement…
“the US has commissioned a crime by hiring an irresponsible bandit” to attack Russia’s early warning system, the official said, apparently referring to Vladimir Zelensky. Rogozin claimed that Washington’s “deep involvement in the armed conflict and total control over Kiev’s military planning means that the claim that the US does not know about Ukrainian plans to strike Russia’s missile defense system can be discarded.”
Thus, we stand not on the precipice, but on the very edge… If such enemy actions are not stopped, an irreversible collapse of the strategic security of nuclear powers will begin. Ukraine attacked key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella — Russian senator, RT
Russian President Vladimir Putin once described the United States as “A madman with a knife.” This latest incident helps to verify that claim.
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Strike On Russian Strategic Early Warning Radar Site Is A Big Deal
Russia losing a strategic early warning radar system is a new twist in the Ukraine conflict that could have further reaching ramifications.
Satellite imagery confirms a Russian strategic early warning radar site in the southwestern end of the country was substantially damaged in a reported Ukrainian drone attack earlier this week. This looks to be a first-of-its-kind attack on a site linked to Russia's general strategic defense. As such, it points to a new and worrisome dimension to the conflict, especially when it comes to the potential use of nuclear weapons.
A satellite image taken on May 23 that The War Zone obtained from Planet Labs of the Armavir Radar Station in Russia's southwestern Krasnodar Krai shows significant debris around one of the site's two Voronezh-DM radar buildings. These are ultra-high-frequency (UHF) over-the-horizon (OTH) radars that are part of Russia's nuclear ballistic missile early warning system.
What can be seen in the satellite image aligns with pictures taken from ground level that emerged on social media earlier today, which show severe damage to both structures housing the Voronezh-DMs at Armavir. There is also clear evidence of multiple hits on the radar buildings. It is worth noting that radar arrays are generally very sensitive and fragile systems, and even relatively limited damage can result in a "mission kill," rendering them inoperable for an extended period of time.
The date the Planet Labs image was taken also aligns with initial reports that the attacks on Armavir occurred sometime between May 22 and May 23.
At the time of writing, Ukrainian authorities do not appear to have publicly claimed responsibility for the attack on Armavir. There also do not look to be any official statements from the Russian government. Ukrainian forces have targeted multiple locations within Krasnodar Krai, which lies just across the Sea of Azov, in the past using kamikaze drones.
There has been some speculation that Ukrainian forces may have targeted Armavir over concerns about the site's ability to help provide advance warning about its strikes involving U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles.
Since receiving a new tranche of ATACMS in secret earlier this year, the Ukrainian armed forces have been using those weapons to good effect against Russian air bases, air defense nodes, and other targets. The latest batch of ATACMS are also longer-range versions than had previously been delivered to Ukraine's military, which have allowed them to hold more targets at risk.
However, experts and observers have pointed out that the Voronezh-DMs at Armavir are fixed in their fields of view, with the primary focus being areas to the southwest. As an example, in 2013, Russian authorities said that the site had detected what appeared to be a ballistic missile launch into the Mediterranean from Libya.
The northern edge of the coverage area of the two radars reportedly does cover the Crimean Peninsula, but there are questions about what the Voronezh-DM, as an OTH, can 'see' that close and that obliquely, especially if the targets in question are lower on the horizon. These radars are primarily designed to detect ballistic missile launches from much further away.
Regardless of Armavir's direct relevance to the conflict in Ukraine or the exact intended goals of the attack on the site, it has much broader ramifications. The two Voronezh-DMs at the facility are a key part of Russia's larger strategic early warning network and their loss, even temporarily, could only degrade the country's ability to detect incoming nuclear threats. There are also concerns about how this could impact the ability of Russia's overall strategic warning network to evaluate potential threats and eliminate false positives due to possible loss of overlapping coverage in certain areas.
Beyond that, it has been pointed out that the attack on Armavir could meet the conditions the Russian government laid out publicly in 2020 for actions that could trigger a nuclear retaliatory strike. Russia's early warning network is part of the country's broader nuclear deterrent posture.
"The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation" include any "attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions," according to the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence the Kremlin put out two years ago.
All of this follows the start of tactical nuclear drills by Russian forces in the country's Southern Military District, which borders Ukraine, on Tuesday. The Russian Ministry of Defense had first announced the drills were coming earlier this month and said they were "in response to provocative statements and threats by certain Western officials against the Russian Federation." This appeared to be a reference to French President Emmanuel Macron saying that he would not rule out sending troops to Ukraine in the future.
The tactical nuclear drills had already reignited discussions about the potential thresholds for Russia's potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, something The War Zone has explored in detail previously.
This is also just the latest Ukrainian attack on Russian territory to point to vulnerabilities in the country's air defense network, even around highly-prized strategic assets.
It very much remains to be seen how exactly Russia will respond to the attack on Armavir, which could potentially involve new nuclear signaling to authorities in Ukraine, as well as the foreign benefactors. Whether this attack is a sign of the start of a broader campaign on the part of Ukrainian forces to target strategic military sites with limited direct involvement in the ongoing conflict and significant importance to Russia's early warning and nuclear deterrent postures is also unclear.
Whatever the case, the Armavir will have significant ramifications and could be an indication that spillover from the war inside Ukraine is taking on a newly concerning form.
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Ukraine attacked key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella — Russian senator
The US should be seen as directly responsible for a Ukrainian strike on a key element of Russia’s nuclear umbrella, Senator Dmitry Rogozin has said, warning that such attacks could lead to the collapse of the entire global nuclear security architecture.
In a statement on Telegram on Saturday, Rogozin, a senator who previously headed up the Russian space agency Roscosmos and is now in charge of a military technical center called Tsar’s Wolves, said that the attack targeted a nuclear early warning system in the southern Krasnodar Region. The Russian Defense Ministry has yet to comment on the matter, while the extent of the damage remains unclear.
Rogozin suggested that it was extremely unlikely that the strike, which Ukrainian media reported involved several drones, was carried out at Kiev’s sole initiative and without US involvement.
According to the senator, Washington has always sought to achieve military superiority over Moscow since the very dawn of the nuclear age, but this rivalry was mostly limited to a battle of minds between scientists, strategists, and policymakers.
This seems to have changed, however, as “the US has commissioned a crime by hiring an irresponsible bandit” to attack Russia’s early warning system, the official said, apparently referring to Vladimir Zelensky.
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Nuclear Experts On Chances Of Russia Using Atomic Weapons In Ukraine
We asked top experts about the chances that an increasingly desperate Russia could use nuclear weapons to change its losing hand in Ukraine.
The specter of nuclear war has loomed larger over the conflict in Ukraine in recent days. Russia's recent announcement of a partial mobilization was paired with direct nuclear threats from President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Chairman of the country's Security Council Dmitry Medvedev. Now combined with continued losses on the battlefield and the sudden illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories in the country's east and south, there appears to be a change in messaging and level of concern from the U.S. government and its NATO allies.
The possibility of Russia releasing the nuclear genie from its bottle after nearly 80 years is clearly being taken more seriously as is the potential for rapid escalation that could come as a result. And the stakes could not be any higher. A nuclear exchange is mankind's problem, not just one of nations, and even a very limited use of a tactical nuclear weapon would change the course of human history. We wrote a recent primer on this rapidly developing issue that you can read here for full background.
So, what are the chances that Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine?
To bring clarity to this extremely challenging and pressing question, The War Zone reached out to the smartest people we know that live and breathe the nuclear weapons issue on a daily basis for their unfiltered opinion. Our participating subject matter experts are:
Ankit Panda — Expert on nuclear policy, Asia, missiles, & space. Stanton Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Author of ‘Kim Jong Un and the Bomb.’
Michael Kofman — Director, Russia Studies at CNA. Senior Adjunct Fellow, CNAS.
We sent this impressive group the same questions independently so that their responses could be as direct and unfiltered as possible. Here they are in full.
Do you see the current circumstances in Ukraine as drastically increasing the chances of Russia using a nuclear weapon, especially in terms of attempting to freeze the conflict under a so-called 'escalate to deescalate' action?
Hans Kristensen:
Probably not “dramatically,” but since the war is going bad for Russia and the rhetoric is intensifying, it indicates a greater willingness to rattle the nuclear sword explicitly in the Ukraine context. In February, nuclear threats were used generically to signal to NATO not to get directly involved. Now nuclear threats are explicitly mentioned against Ukraine. This is not an "escalate-to-deescalate” scenario as described in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review because Russia is not under attack from NATO and the survival of the Russian state is not at stake. It does not fit Russia’s declaratory policy, but Dmitry Medvedev’s statement earlier today [September 28] sounds like an attempt to link the two nonetheless.
Russia is deterred from attacking NATO directly but if the Kremlin believes – as Medvedev suggested today – that it doesn’t have to fear a NATO response, then it could potentially lower the nuclear threshold. But there are other factors too – what will Russia gain from nuclear use and what will it lose more - that influence the decision. Despite the saber-rattling and brinkmanship, the Russians – certainly the military - know full well the consequences to Russia from a greater war with NATO.
Ankit Panda:
The risk of nuclear use by Russia increased over the pre-war baseline after the start of the war in February. Since then, I don’t assess a significant shift in the risks of nuclear use provided that the basic thresholds of no direct NATO operational involvement in Ukraine and no direct Russian strikes on NATO hold. Russia’s battlefield setbacks, however, probably marginally increase the risk of nuclear use, but I’d still suggest, in subjective terms, that the risk remains low. The logic of “escalate-to-deescalate” isn’t a formal component of Russian military doctrine, but Putin has shown himself willing to maneuver as he’d like to accomplish political objectives.
Stephen Schwartz:
Desperate people in control of nuclear weapons (especially those committed to always appearing strong) is never a good combination. I think the biggest risk at the moment is if/when Putin declares that his sham referenda show overwhelming support for annexing large parts of eastern Ukraine, and then he annexes that territory and warns that any further military attacks there will be considered attacks on Russia itself, risking a nuclear response to defend Russian territory. By doing so, he may create a dangerous commitment trap, compelling him to respond (even if he was only bluffing) in order to avoid appearing weak and further undermining his already weak military position with Ukraine and NATO, as well as at home. And if he wasn’t bluffing, well…
Michael Kofman:
No, Russian thinking on nuclear weapons is probably much closer to 'escalate to not lose' under certain conditions, rather than escalating to maintain gains. It's worth noting that Russia hasn't used nuclear weapons even after suffering significant casualties and defeats in Ukraine, so the criteria are clearly beyond such battlefield losses. This is just one person's opinion, but rather than a tactical defeat, it may be tied to the loss of cohesion and control over the forces in theater, leading to a collapse of the military, or a significant loss of territory within that context, such that Russia is unable to recover it.
If a nuclear weapon was detonated, even just to display a willingness to use nuclear weapons, killing nobody and resulting in little radiological consequences, what do you see the world community doing in response? What about NATO? What would happen right after?
Hans Kristensen:
The international response to Russian nuclear use in Ukraine would likely be forceful and overwhelmingly condemning. Breaking the nuclear taboo after 77 years would be a monumental political, social, and military event. It would likely lead to even greater isolation of Russia, and Putin’s last remaining friends abandoning him. NATO’s options would likely be complicated. It is by no means certain that the alliance would agree to scale up military involvement in Ukraine. Many would, but one could easily imagine Turkey, Hungary, and Italy would use the event to increase calls for a negotiated settlement of the war. Putin appears to already have declared an energy war on the West, which will likely lead to energy and money hardness in the winter months and weaken public support for continuing to support Ukraine. Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the alliance presumably can’t just attack Russian forces in Ukraine (certainly Russian territory) without declaring war on Russia. If it did, we would have a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO – the very scenario Biden and other Western leaders have said they don't want because of the much greater consequences. Declaring war would likely be blocked by Turkey, Hungary, and Italy. That could potentially leave the United States or a coalition of the willing to react militarily anyway and gamble that Russia would be deterred from escalating further.
Ankit Panda:
I think this is the hardest case for a response, in many ways: the nuclear taboo would have been broken and the first atmospheric nuclear detonation in anger since Nagasaki would have taken place. But given that the effects would be limited (radiologically and in terms of damage to humans), I’d see the upper-end of a response by NATO and the west to probably consist of conventional strikes against the Russian unit that delivered the weapon combined with various other political-economic measures to continue to punish Moscow. As a practical matter, because this is a tough case, it would be best for the West to maintain ambiguity about the precise nature of its response while clearly communicating that there would be serious consequences for breaching this threshold.
Stephen Schwartz:
I don’t know because, thankfully, we have never reached that crisis point in the 77 years nuclear weapons have been around. It is very difficult to imagine NATO or the United States or Russia backing down after that (not least because doing so would call into question the very essence of nuclear deterrence). So, again, even if no one really wanted to use nuclear weapons and everyone understood such use would likely be militarily and politically catastrophic, they might nevertheless find themselves unable to ratchet down tensions out of fear that doing so would lead to equally bad or worse consequences.
People forget that nuclear deterrence isn’t just about possessing nuclear weapons but also being perceived by one's adversaries as being both ready and willing to use them under extreme circumstances. That we have not yet witnessed the third use of a nuclear weapon in war is, I believe, in spite of our unwarranted faith in the magical power of nuclear deterrence, not because of it.
The 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis is in one month. Everyone understands that that crisis ended peacefully and chalks it up to deterrence “working," but far too few people appreciate how incredibly close we came to accidental nuclear war multiple times during those tense 13 days because human beings and the deadly technologies we rely upon are inherently fallible. Sheer luck played a pivotal role in the ultimately peaceful outcome, not plans or posturing or psychology.
Do we dare tempt fate twice?
Michael Kofman:
I don't know and it depends. Demonstrative employment can yield different scenarios.
What about if a number of military or even civilian targets were hit with nuclear weapons in Ukraine? How does that change the calculus over just the display of use?
Hans Kristensen:
Beyond a demonstration use of a nuclear weapon (perhaps over the Black Sea), Russia could potentially decide to use a few nuclear weapons to weaken the Ukraine counteroffensive, halt the momentum, and use the pause to get a military advantage. But that would likely be a short-term gain as the Ukrainians would likely soon regroup and resume the push. Russian nuclear use presumably would only postpone the inevitable defeat – unless Putin continued to use nuclear weapons.
Prior to the U.S. Gulf War, the Pentagon studied the use of nuclear weapons against Hussein’s army in the desert and found it would have required the use of quite a number of weapons to have a decisive effect. Putin could then potentially decide to use a public terror campaign and level Kyiv and one or more cities to break the Ukrainian's will to fight. He has already demonstrated that he does not care much for civilians in Ukraine. And his conventional bombing of eastern cities so far has caused so much destruction that a tactical nuclear weapon almost seems like more of the same.
Ankit Panda:
The use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Ukraine to accomplish military objectives seems unlikely to me; Russia’s lower-yield nuclear weapons would have difficulties providing serious military benefit against distributed Ukrainian infantry units and sparse mechanized units. The primary effect would be to shock and terrorize the Ukrainians, but this could easily have the effect of reinforcing Ukraine’s will to fight in an existential struggle. Putin has little to gain here, I think. Responding to this would present NATO with similar challenges to the scenario above, but I suspect the response would be the same (as would my prescription on signaling).
Stephen Schwartz:
I have to believe it would, but in what direction I don’t know. Thankfully, no one on Earth has any experience fighting an actual nuclear war. Will calmer heads prevail or will the complex mechanisms we’ve relied on for three-quarters of a century instead propel us even closer to doomsday?
Michael Kofman:
I suspect there will be a response from the U.S. and several nations, what form it will take place depends on the context. These are ultimately political decisions, and no matter what leaders say, they themselves may not know what they will do until the moment arrives.
What about the possible use of chemical weapons? Do you see Russia escalating there first, if at all?
Hans Kristensen:
That’s another option that seems more credible than nuclear use. Chemical weapons would be an escalation but not as taboo as nuclear weapons. Putin would still have other options (to nuclear use). Others have already used them in warfare (Iraq and Syria) and Ukrainian front-line forces are probably not well equipped to protect themselves from chemical weapons. But it would be complicated for Russian forces to subsequently operate in areas that had been contaminated. And it would likely harden the Ukrainian will to fight.
Ankit Panda:
Yes. We’ve seen from Syria that Russia views chemical weapons as having military utility in urban warfare, in particular. This is a much greater risk in the near-term than nuclear use.
Stephen Schwartz:
Is this possible? I suppose, but only if it is somehow advantageous to Russia. As Russia tries to draft large numbers of fresh recruits (many with little or no experience with chemical weapons), it may find that any use of such weapons would hinder rather than help its attempts to take and hold Ukrainian territory, to say nothing of the worldwide condemnation that would result if it did.
Michael Kofman:
No, not really. They bring little value relative to the political cost of using them. They're also not especially useful for a power with Russia's conventional or nuclear means.
How much warning do you believe Ukraine, the U.S., and NATO intelligence would have before Russia actually detonated a nuclear weapon?
Hans Kristensen:
If the nuclear weapon is a tactical weapon, then I think they would have several days warning. After Putin ordered the military to prepare, the military would have to communicate to the 12th Main Directive to release the warhead from storage, the custodial and security forces needed to transport the warhead to the unit with the launcher, where they would work to install the warhead on the weapon. Then Putin would have to issue the order, which would have to trickle down the chain of command. During all these steps, U.S. intelligence could potentially discover that something was up. One could also imagine that Putin didn’t plan to use nuclear weapons but chose to disclose preparations to increase the coercive effect of the threat to force Ukraine and some Western countries to back down and demand Ukraine enter negotiations. Use of strategic nuclear weapons would probably have less warning time because the ICBMs and SLBMs are already on alert with warheads installed.
Ankit Panda:
We know where Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons are stored and U.S. military intelligence would likely have good indicators if warheads are being removed and mated with delivery systems. The U.S. and NATO would also publicize this – loudly. I expect we’d have warning.
Stephen Schwartz:
Russian nonstrategic or tactical weapons are not believed to be deployed for immediate use on a regular basis but instead are kept in several 'central storage' facilities. Presumably, these are closely monitored by US and NATO intelligence so that we would notice unusual movements of personnel or equipment or materiel out of them. Likewise, we would presumably detect elevated alert levels, and increased security, activity, and communications for any nuclear-capable units that received weapons and/or were making them ready for use.
The amount of warning could vary from days to hours to minutes depending on how closely we’re watching and the stage of deployment (e.g., moving weapons out of central storage would suggest an increased level of readiness but not necessarily for immediate use). Increasing readiness to use strategic nuclear weapons would include increased communications to and from missile and submarine bases. Submarines surging out of port would also be a worrisome indicator. So would the removal of additional bomber-based nuclear weapons from central storage (where most are kept on a day-to-day basis).
Russia, of course, knows this and can use that knowledge to signal its intentions without necessarily making additional overt nuclear threats. On top of all that, one would expect certain senior military personnel and political leaders to, in the most extreme case, relocate to emergency operations centers or bunkers.
Any launch of ballistic missiles would be detected almost instantly by early-warning satellites spotting their exhaust plumes. A few minutes later, ground-based, long-range, early-warning radars in Greenland, Great Britain, and Alaska would confirm the launch and provide an assessment of missile trajectories and the estimated time-to-target. Nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft or cruise missiles, especially within the current theater of war, would not be detected so easily (although unusual movements of aircraft at bases known to house nuclear weapons would not go unnoticed), and even if they were, the warning time would only be measured in tens of minutes, if that.
Michael Kofman:
Russia may actually want to offer plenty of warning in an effort to signal and thereby coerce, i.e. make the act of preparation visible. In general, I suspect that overt preparations might be observed prior to use.
A big thank you to all our experts for taking the time to answer our questions on this incredibly challenging but extremely important topic.
Rogozin claimed that Washington’s “deep involvement in the armed conflict and total control over Kiev’s military planning means that the version that the US does not know about Ukrainian plans to strike Russia’s missile defense system can be discarded.”
Thus, we stand not on the precipice, but on the very edge… If such enemy actions are not stopped, an irreversible collapse of the strategic security of nuclear powers will begin.
The attack apparently targeted an advanced Voronezh radar station in the city of Armavir, which went into operation in 2013. The system can detect incoming cruise and ballistic missiles at a range of 6,000km and can track up to 500 targets. During the inauguration of the system, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that it would significantly increase the country’s defense capabilities in the southern and southwestern directions.
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